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20 DECEMBER 1991



JPRS Report

Arms Control

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JPRS-TAC-91-030

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TASS Cited on Soviet Troop Cuts in Far East

OW1211191091 Beijing XINHUA in English
1859 GMT 12 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, November 12 (XINHUA)—The Soviet Union will soon cut 200,000 troops in Asia, including 120,000 in the Far East, the country's TASS News Agency reported here today.

TASS also quoted Colonel-General Viktor Novozhilov, commander of the Far Eastern Military District, as saying that the country has disbanded 11 air force squadrons and "the number of divisions stationed in the Soviet Far East will be reduced by 50 per cent."

The Soviet Defence Ministry announced earlier that the country would dismobilise 700,000 troops in the next few years.

Paper Views Disputes on Korea Nuclear Arms Case

HK2411061091 Hong Kong HSIN WAN PAO
in Chinese 23 Nov 91 p 1

["New Talk" column: "Disputes Over Development of Nuclear Weapons in Korea"]

[Text] The situation on the Korean peninsula was one of the many issues that were taken up during U.S. Secretary of State Baker's recent visit to China. After Baker returned home, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney visited Seoul for talks which resulted in a joint statement with Yi Chong-ku, South Korean minister of national defense. The statement announced that the second stage of the plan withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea—which had originally been scheduled for 1993—was put off in view of North Korea's ongoing nuclear development effort.

It can thus be seen that Baker's discussion with Beijing on the situation on the peninsula can well be linked with the new decision adopted by the United States and South Korea. Recently, news media have even spread a hearsay that the United States and South Korea would quite likely launch a military operation against northern Korea, should the issue concerning North Korea's nuclear development effort remain unsolved. Now that the world situation is relaxing and many regional conflicts are nearing reconciliation, the situation on the Korean peninsula—the only issue that is deteriorating—is arousing particular misgivings and is drawing special concern.

On the day Baker left Beijing for home, Wu Jianmin, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, in briefing reporters, mentioned the Chinese-U.S. discussion on the Korean peninsula situation. The Chinese noted that they had always been concerned about peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, had supported all ideas and actions which can contribute to the establishment of a nuclear free zone on the peninsula, and are willing to work together with all parties to solve this issue. The

Chinese side also maintains that the international community should push for a settlement of the issues concerned through negotiations between the northern and southern parts of Korea.

Korean leader Kim Il-sung visited Beijing and held talks with Chinese leaders before Baker's Beijing trip. Kim Il-sung had probably been informed in advance of the stance that China would express to the U.S. side, and, on the other hand, it is very likely that the Chinese side has already passed on the Korean authorities' policy and views to the U.S. side as well.

The problem is that the U.S. side insists that Korea has built a nuclear reactor somewhere northwest of Pyongyang which is ready to make nuclear weapons; and, therefore, the Americans asked the Korean authorities to let the International Atomic Energy Agency inspect the facility on the spot. Korea has turned down this demand. Instead, Korea has raised a counteroffer—it will consider the request for international inspection only if the United States withdraws its nuclear umbrella from South Korea, pulls out all its troops, and if North and South Korea sign a mutual nonaggression treaty.

As revealed by Wu Jianmin, China's stance includes three main points: First, China hopes that peace and stability will be maintained on the Korean peninsula; second, it wishes to see the Korean peninsula turned into a nuclear free zone, and, if both North and South Korea are to discard nuclear facilities, North Korea should not be the only one to reconsider its nuclear development plan—South Korea must have U.S. nuclear arms withdrawn from its territory as well; and, third, it hopes that all the parties concerned will help the northern and southern sides settle the issue through talks, rather than adding fuel to the flames.

Although the U.S.-South Korean communique on the postponed withdrawal of U.S. troops released after Baker's return home has not mentioned any possible operation, it does serve as a message suggesting the possibility of either negotiations or war, and this constitutes pressure on northern Korea.

According to the latest report, Taylor, deputy director of the U.S. Strategic Research Institute, stayed a week in Pyongyang at the Korean authorities' invitation to hold talks with government and military officials. During his stopover in Seoul on his way home, Taylor conveyed two messages: First, if the U.S. nuclear base accepts international agencies for inspection, Korea will also accept an examination and will not set any more preconditions. Second, if the United States and South Korea launch a joint northward offensive, on its part, Korea will wage a full-scale counteroffensive. Korea might be defeated in the end, but it will definitely not announce a ceasefire before the war is over, like Iraq did.

There seemed to be hope for some improvement in the situation on the Korean peninsula after this report came in. Now it is the United States' turn to respond. As viewed from Bush's remarks, the United States may

accept the proposal for a simultaneous examination of both sides' nuclear facilities. As viewed from Cheney's remarks, however, the U.S. side may ask for something more, namely, it wants to make sure that Korea will remove its nuclear facilities after the examination. If this request is made, there will certainly be further complications.

RENMIN RIBAO Views 'Star Wars' Program

*HK2711004291 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
25 Nov 91 p 6*

["Roundup" by Zhang Qixin (1728 0796 2500): "The United States Makes New 'Star Wars' Program"]

[Text] Washington—After coordination and consultations, the House of Representatives and Senate of the U.S. Congress recently gave preliminary approval to a new "Star Wars" program. The main part of the program is to spend \$25 billion on deploying a land-based antimissile system to protect the United States from possible missile attack. Newspapers here pointed out that once this program is approved the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as "Star Wars") will progress from research to actual deployment.

The concept of the new program is different from the "Star Wars" program proposed by President Reagan eight years ago. It is on a much smaller scale. In 1983, Reagan indicated in his Strategic Defense Initiative proposal that a large-scale and new type of antimissile defense system featuring chiefly directional weapons would be built in space and on land to intercept and destroy the incoming warheads of missiles. According to the concept, the system would make multistage interceptions in the course of an enemy missile so that the system was "watertight." Therefore, the Pentagon established the Strategic Defense Bureau and every year allocated huge sums of money for research and development. However, the money the program consumed was astounding and there were many technical problems. The program repeatedly came under fire from the country's military and political circles. The Bush Administration has made adjustments to the program, proposing the "brilliant pebbles" concept, namely concentrating on deploying many small, smart missiles to intercept the enemy's nuclear missiles. This was to be the first stage of the implementation of the "Star Wars" program.

The new program is now different from the former one. First, the intercepting missiles for antimissile defense will be land-based, not space-based. Analysts here believe this program was successfully adopted because the performance of the "Patriot" antimissile missile in the Gulf war made a good impression on many people. Therefore, people now thought that land-based missile interception could realistically fulfill the role of antimissile defense. It is reported that the intercepting missile under proposal will far surpass the "Patriot" in speed, flying range, and precision. According to plans, the

United States first intends to deploy 100 such intercepting missiles at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota in 1996, and after this build five or six similar bases in other areas. The Strategic Defense Bureau estimates that the first base will cost close to \$10 billion and that the total cost of all six bases will be \$25 billion. However, estimates from scientific circles put the cost at over \$60 billion.

Second, the objective of the new program is to effect a "limited defense," with the focus placed on guarding against "accidental" missile attacks launched by "irresponsible countries" rather than any nuclear strike by the Soviet Union. It is said that in the wake of the changes in the political situation in the Soviet Union, the United States is more and more worried about the possible proliferation of missiles and nuclear arms. The task of the new program is to guard against an attack by a limited number of missiles rather than a massive offensive by tens of thousands of missiles from the Soviet Union as originally conceived by Reagan.

However, whether this new program can be realized or not is conditional on quite a few uncertain factors. Many people unfavorable to the program argue that a so-called "accidental missile attack" is almost impossible. What is more, it has been predicted that by the turn of the century no such so-called "irresponsible country" could possibly possess a sufficient number of long-range missiles to constitute a threat against the security of the United States. This being the case, this "expensive" new antimissile program "based on no real need" will arouse a heated debate during future discussion on budgetary appropriations.

This new program has raised another issue: It contradicts the 1972 Antimissile Treaty. According to that treaty signed between the Soviet Union and the United States, each side is allowed to build only one antimissile base. If the United States plans to build five to six antimissile bases, it certainly will have to negotiate with the Soviet Union to amend treaty. Experts here believe that any amendment to this treaty, which serves as a cornerstone of arms control, and any attempt to rescind certain restrictive articles in it may lead to consequences dreadful to contemplate. Therefore, no matter how the "Star Wars" program is to be changed, its necessity and possibility are bound to evoke controversies both at home and abroad.

Further on UN Envoy's Address on World Peace

*OW2611122991 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0723 GMT 26 Nov 91*

[By reporter Yang Yaohua (2254 5069 5478)]

[Text] United Nations, 25 Nov (XINHUA)—Addressing the Committee for Political and Security Issues of the 46th United Nations General Assembly about China's position on a series of international security issues, Jin Yongjian, permanent deputy representative from China to the United Nations, pointed out that halting the arms

race, realizing effective disarmament, and establishing a new international economic order are essential for eliminating the military threat, easing world tension, and safeguarding international peace and security.

Jin Yongjian said: To safeguard world peace and security, China is consistently opposed to the arms race and stands for the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear, space, chemical and biological weapons, and a drastic reduction in conventional arms. China has adopted a constructive stand toward arms control and disarmament, and has taken a series of unilateral actions.

Jin Yongjian pointed out that the actual state of world armaments has remained basically unchanged even though the United States and the Soviet Union have made initial disarmament moves, and Europe has made some progress in reducing its conventional arms. He said: The U.S.-Soviet accord on reducing nuclear weapons, and the measures they recently announced, have yet to be actually implemented. Even after these measures have been implemented, they will still own the world's largest nuclear arsenals, capable of destroying mankind several times. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union must continue to undertake their special disarmament responsibilities.

Jin Yongjian added: The establishment of a new international economic order is the key to eliminating the nonmilitary threat to international peace and security. Development cannot be separated from peace and security, and North-South relations are the essence of the issue of development. Without a fundamental improvement in North-South relations, world peace and stability can hardly be safeguarded. To expedite their common development, all countries must have the right to choose the type of social systems, economic patterns, and development courses compatible with their situations; the right to exercise effective control of their resources and their development; and the right to take part in handling international economic affairs. Only when the gap between the North and the South has been reduced and a new international economic order has been established based on equality, rationality, reciprocity, and cooperation can turmoils and unrests be completely eradicated, and can world peace, security, and development be reinforced.

Jin Yongjian pointed out: The world today is still not peaceful; the world has become even more turbulent, and new conflicts have sharpened. Peace has not been achieved in the Gulf region; the Arab-Israeli conflict is far from being settled; national, ethnic and religious contradictions have sharpened in some countries; and the independence and territorial integrity of some countries have been destroyed by fierce civil wars and political turmoil. In terms of disarmament, the international arms race has not stopped, and the progress made in multilateral disarmament is unsatisfactory. Economically, the unbalanced economic development between the North and the South has worsened—the gap has

widened. These have become important factors threatening world peace, security, and stability.

Jin Yongjian said: At a time when the old pattern is giving way to a new one, the direction in which the world is heading and the kind of new international order to be established have become increasingly acute issues confronting people everywhere. He pointed out: The new international order should be in line with the purposes and principles prescribed in the UN Charter, and with the universally accepted principles which are effectively guiding international relations. China stands for the establishment of a new international order based on the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence. These principles reflect the essential characteristics of new international relations—respecting the rights of people of all countries to determine their own destiny is the core of these characteristics. The world should not be dominated by superpowers, nor should international affairs be monopolized by a few big countries. An international order based on military strength and power politics is not only unreliable, but will also jeopardize regional and world peace and security.

Jin Yongjian stressed: There are many types of social systems, concepts of values, and ideologies in the world, and any attempt to impose one uniform pattern on other countries is impossible, and even dangerous. The development of countries and the progress of mankind require a peaceful international environment. To create such an environment, the key requirement is that all countries respect each other's sovereignty, treat each other equally, seek common ground while reserving their differences, cooperate with each other on friendly terms, and coexist with each other harmoniously. No country should seek hegemony or dominate international affairs.

He said: China pursues an independent and peaceful foreign policy, strictly abides by the principles mentioned above, and is ready to work with all countries in contributing to the establishment of a just, rational, and new international order.

Spokesman Praises DPRK Nuclear Proposal

[“PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says China Appraises Positively DPRK Foreign Ministry's Four-Point Proposal”]

CM2911132991 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO
OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese 29 Nov 91 p1

[Text] Beijing, November 28 (XINHUA)—China appraises positively the new four-point proposal raised by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on nuclear safeguards, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin here today at a weekly press conference.

The spokesman made the remark in response to a question on the four-point proposal concerning the signing of an agreement on nuclear safeguards in a

statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK).

"We appraise positively the new four-point proposal contained in the November 25 statement of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK," said the spokesman.

"Last July, the DPRK put forward a proposal on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, and the U.S. side has announced the plan to withdraw its nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. Not long ago, the South Korean side also put forward a proposal on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," according to the spokesman.

He said, "We believe that all these have laid a sound foundation for solving the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula."

"We hope that all sides concerned will adopt a flexible and positive approach and take practical steps to start dialogues as soon as possible, so as to reach a proper solution to this question," he said.

Border Troop Talks With USSR Achieve 'Progress'

OW0312062191 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0257 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Moscow, 2 Dec (XINHUA)—Between 11 November and 2 December in Moscow, Chinese and Soviet diplomatic and military experts held their fifth round of negotiations on implementing an agreement on the guiding principles for mutual reduction of military forces along their borders and the strengthening of mutual trust in the military field. Representatives from Russian and Tajik Foreign Ministries attended the meeting.

The Chinese delegation headed by Ambassador Wang Ganghua [3769 6921 5478] and the Soviet delegation headed by Ambassador Solovyev exchanged views on drafting a related agreement under a friendly and realistic atmosphere and achieved certain progress. The two sides agreed that the next round of negotiations will be held in Beijing.

The Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow on 11 November. Rogachev, deputy minister of External Relations, and General Kuznetsov, deputy chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, met with the Chinese delegation separately during the negotiations. The Chinese delegation also visited the Northern Caucasus Military District.

AUSTRALIA

Australian Foreign Minister on Nuclear Ship Ban

BK2911115591 Melbourne Radio Australia in English
0800 GMT 29 Nov 91

[From the "International Report" program]

[Text] The visits by nuclear-powered ships are safe. Australia's Foreign Minister Gareth Evans told New Zealanders today. After meeting with his New Zealand counterpart Don McKinnon for talks in Wellington, Senator Evans told a press conference that he knew it would shock and dismay some colleagues, but his government's view is that propulsion brings only negligible risks.

His comments come as the New Zealand Government is attempting to set up a review of the country's ban on nuclear-powered or armed ships with the hope of allowing renewed access for nuclear-propelled vessels. Our New Zealand correspondent, Brendan Burns, reports:

[Begin recording] [Burns] The issue of nuclear ships is also contentious in New Zealand, but Senator Evans today seems happy to steer a course toward it. Since President Bush announced two months ago that the United States was taking nuclear weapons off certain ships, the National [Party] government in Wellington has been promoting a review of the anti-nuclear law it inherited on coming to office last year. No details of the review's membership or terms of inquiry have yet emerged, but the government clearly hopes to convince generally dubious New Zealanders that the nuclear-powered ships minus their weapons are safe.

After speaking to Don McKinnon today about the review of access for nuclear-powered vessels, Sen. Evans gave his views on the issue.

[Evans] We obviously have a very close analysis of the safety implications of letting in nuclear-powered vessels into particular ports with quite a comprehensive regime and rules that govern the access of such vessels. It is backed by quite a comprehensive research and analysis of the risks that are involved and we think in that sense they are negligible. It may have come as a great shock and cause for dismay for a significant segment of my colleagues in the political community and extrapolitical community of various parts of the world, but it happens to be our judgement, and more or less here by most other sensible people.

[Burns] Having inferred that New Zealand was not sensible to have banned nuclear-powered ships for the past six years, Sen. Evans moved to express his hope for the return of Australia's smaller neighbor to ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Defense Pact] defense relationship with the United States.

[Evans] Obviously the Bush announcement on nuclear weapons, in particular the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, does change the environment. It does give us some grounds for confidence or hope that it may be possible for New Zealand to get its policy (in a kind condition) that would make possible the recreation of the full three-legged alliance, but whether that is possible is a matter for New Zealand Government.

[Burns] Apart from seeing a need to allow the resumption of access to nuclear-powered ships, Sen. Evans also identified a number of other residual issues which remain through the plan by New Zealand to continue the ban on nuclear weapons.

[Evans] Conceivably some lingering difficulties on the weapons issue to the extent that the United States Government will take some time to remove the weapons from existing ships and to the extent that it is not excluding possibility of replacing them in future, and to the extent that it seems likely to be retaining some elements of this doctrine into the foreseeable future. All of those [word indistinct] will create complications in one way or the other, but nonetheless it is a very different kind of debate. I would have thought, in this country than the one that was occurring a year ago.

[Burns] Aside from nuclear ships, Sen. Evans and Mr. McKinnon discussed a host of regional and international issues with the Australian minister talking about his recent visit to the Soviet Union and the New Zealand minister reporting on three days he had last week in New Caledonia. Sen. Evans briefed Mr. McKinnon on his view that the forced evacuation of Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan from Phnom Penh would not abort the Cambodian peace process. The two men agreed Australia and New Zealand have broadly similar approaches to the massacre in East Timor—that of having expressed abhorance, but awaiting Indonesia's internal inquiry.

[Burns] Sen. Evans has now returned to Australia, with another of the regular bilateral meetings with the New Zealand counterpart scheduled for the middle of next year. [end recording]

NORTH KOREA

Official Renews Call for U.S. Nuclear Pullout

OW2111113891 Tokyo KYODO in English 1125 GMT
21 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Beijing, Nov. 21 KYODO—A senior North Korean Foreign Ministry official said Thursday complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear warheads in South Korea is necessary for Pyongyang to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

Chon In-chol, who headed the North Korean delegation in the Tokyo-Pyongyang talks which ended Wednesday, told KYODO NEWS SERVICE that the condition of

allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection will be the total removal of a nuclear threat to North Korea.

South Korean news agency YONHAP reported Thursday that President No Tae-u is likely to declare his country free of nuclear weapons during a visit by U.S. President George Bush in January.

The report quoted an unidentified government source as saying Washington and Seoul have agreed to the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea by the end of 1991.

Chon said if that happens, it will be an important step toward accepting international inspection.

Chon, however, denied views that bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang are progressing below the surface, saying the U.S. is not showing "positive reaction." [passage omitted]

Envoy in Moscow Condemns U.S. Nuclear Stance

*SK2811040491 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2300 GMT 23 Nov 91*

[Text] In connection with the United States and its supporting forces more openly maneuvering to put international pressure on us over the issue of nuclear inspection, a news conference was held in our country's embassy in the Soviet Union on 22 November. Reporters from Soviet papers, a news agency, and radio participated in the press conference.

At the press conference, the counselor of our country's embassy in the Soviet Union spoke. After exposing that the United States and its supporting forces recently babbled as if the DPRK would possess nuclear weapons in a few months, he said:

This is a downright lie. We have repeatedly declared that we have neither the intention nor capability to develop nuclear weapons. In addition, proceeding from a noble desire to remove the nuclear danger on the Korean peninsula and for guaranteeing the peace of Asia and the rest of the world, the DPRK Government put forward a proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone. It has positively made efforts to realize this.

If the United States is interested in turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, it should not babble about our nonexistent nuclear weapons but withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Referring to the nuclear inspection issue, he pointed out: Some countries are trying to force a nuclear inspection on us. This is a wanton encroachment on our country's independence.

Because our country does not possess nuclear weapons, it does not object to a nuclear inspection. Under the

circumstances in which approximately 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons have been actually deployed in South Korea, if a nuclear inspection is carried out, it should be simultaneously carried out on the nuclear bases in South Korea, instead of unilaterally carrying out a nuclear inspection of us.

The nuclear inspection issue is one which should be resolved independently between our country and the International Atomic Energy Agency, not an issue which should be resolved by certain international pressure. We will not tolerate other countries' pressure intervening in internal affairs and will not accept the pressure.

At the press conference, he answered questions raised by reporters.

Statement Endorses Simultaneous Nuclear Inspection

*SK2511123491 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1100 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Statement issued by the DPRK Foreign Ministry on 25 November]

[Text] Statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry:

Removing the nuclear danger and achieving denuclearization on the Korean peninsula are drawing international attention. Our government considers the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea as essential for guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula and has made steady efforts to realize this.

When our government signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it expected the United States, as a signatory, to discharge its legal obligation required by the treaty and to discontinue a nuclear threat against us, as well as respond to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The United States, in possession of nuclear weapons, is obliged to cease activity with nuclear weapons which is threatening toward signatory countries who do not possess nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the United States continues to threaten our republic with nuclear weapons, creating an atmosphere for a nuclear war. In doing so, it has systematically violated the obligation required by the treaty.

Since the republic signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the resolution of the nuclear safeguard accords has been delayed. This is entirely attributable to the United States, which has violated its treaty obligations and ignored our just demand for withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea and removing the nuclear danger.

Some time ago, U.S. President Bush announced a proposal for reducing tactical nuclear weapons. According to the proposal, the United States admitted that nuclear weapons have been deployed in South Korea for a real war and revealed its intent to withdraw them.

Regarding this U.S. measure as a way to lead us into signing the nuclear safeguard accords, we welcomed his proposal. After the proposal, the South Korean person in authority announced a declaration on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. We estimated that though belated, the South Korean person in authority, who has objected to even the word "denuclearization" announced a proposal with some points in common with our proposal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

If the United States and the South Korean authorities had taken such an attitude before, our signing the nuclear safeguard accords would not have been turned into the complicated issue it is.

As a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we have never opposed the signing [chehyol] of the nuclear safeguard accord itself. Rather, we have made all sincere efforts to sign the accord quickly. Since we signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, we have justly claimed that we will sign the nuclear safeguards, which is our obligation required by the treaty. Therefore, the United States, as the treaty requires, should withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea and remove the nuclear threat against us.

Despite the nuclear weapons in South Korea, the United States is forcing a unilateral inspection on us while saying that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea.

As everything becomes clear, if the United States had accepted our just demand from the beginning and taken a positive measure like its current proposal, the issue of our signing the nuclear safeguard accords would have been resolved long ago and there would not have been an issue.

Whether our signing the nuclear safeguard accords will be easily and rapidly settled depends on how sincerely the United States is committed to the pullout of nuclear weapons.

As for the South Korean authorities: When we put forward the proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, they should not have blindly opposed it but accepted it.

The North and the South, as the same fellow countrymen, should not develop nuclear weapons and should accept a simultaneous nuclear inspection. From this standpoint, the DPRK Government declares:

First, if the United States begins the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, we will sign the nuclear safeguard accords.

Second, both an inspection to confirm U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and an inspection of our nuclear facilities should be carried out simultaneously.

Third, DPRK-U.S. negotiations to discuss simultaneous nuclear inspection and removing the nuclear danger against us should be held.

Fourth, because the North and the South expressed a common will not to develop nuclear weapons and to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, they should hold North-South negotiation to achieve this.

The DPRK Government and people are convinced that our aboveboard proposal for removing the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, for guaranteeing peace and stability here, and for safeguarding the peace of Asia and the rest of the world will enjoy positive support of the peace-loving parties and the people of all countries of the world.

Japan's Stance on Nuclear Issue Viewed

SK3011052891 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0453 GMT 30 Nov 91

[“NODONG SINMUN Commentator's Article: ‘What Does Japan Seek in Nuclear Problem?’”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang November 30 (KCNA)—Japan expressed the official position of its government categorically negating the November 25 statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry concerning the question of the signing of the nuclear safeguards accord, contending that “there is no significant change in the stand” of the DPRK.

In this regard, NODONG SINMUN today runs a commentator's article titled “What Does Japan Seek in Nuclear Problem?”

Noting that only Japan takes a negative stand toward our statement, the article says:

The United States and the South Korean authorities, the parties directly concerned with this problem, are attaching importance to the statement and reacting to it affirmatively. But Japan which is not a party concerned with it is uttering words of complaint.

Are the Japanese authorities so blind as to be unable to see the positive nature of the statement? The answer is no.

The United States and the South Korean authorities have not yet clarified their “official stand”, saying that since the North's statement is very important, they are now seriously studying it. The Japanese Government, however, raised a rumpus, expressing a negative position earlier than them.

Is this because Japan has “an electronic brain” more sensitive than others?

No. It is because Japan has an axe to grind. It would be wise to regard this as an act urged by the sinister desire of Japan to become a military power and arm herself with nuclear weapons.

It is nobody's secret that Japan is trying to seek a pretext for nuclear armament at any cost with a dream of becoming a military power.

Therefore, Japan intends to use the fictitious "development of nuclear weapons" by the DPRK as a pretext for arming Japan with nuclear weapons.

This is not our groundless and subjective judgement.

The current Japanese press tone tells us that Japan is openly trying to obtain from the question of our signing the Nuclear Safeguards Accord a pretext for her own nuclear armament.

It is not first time that Japan took a negative stand toward the DPRK Foreign Ministry statement on the nuclear problem.

When the DPRK Foreign Ministry put forward in July a new proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, China and the Soviet Union expressed full support for it and the United States and South Korea also considered the proposal to be positive. Only Japan, however, expressed a negative stand toward it, saying that it is infeasible.

At the September meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency held in Vienna, the United States kept silence but Japan proposed the adoption of a "resolution" calling for an international pressure on the DPRK regarding the question of its signing the Nuclear Safeguards Accord.

The scheme of overseas troops dispatch of the "Self-Defense Forces" getting all the more undisguised in the Japanese Diet is nothing but part of Japan's moves to become a political and military power.

While taking issue with our sincere efforts to solve the question of its signing the Nuclear Safeguards Accord in a fair way, which are highly estimated by all people, Japan seeks to make itself a military power armed with nuclear weapons and act a political power, exercising a certain "influence" on someone.

Japan's act shows that she has not yet discarded its inveterate old aggressive nature.

But the present era will never tolerate Japan's ulterior criminal intention to frighten the Japanese people with a fiction of the DPRK's "development of nuclear weapons" and revive the departed spirit of Japanese militarism.

SOUTH KOREA

North, South Agree To Ban Nuclear, CBW Arms

SK2011094491 Seoul YONHAP in English 0929 GMT
20 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 20 (OANA-YONHAP)—South and North Korea agreed in principle to include a clause on having no nuclear, chemical and biological weapons on the Korean peninsula in an inter-Korean agreement, a ranking government source said Wednesday.

The two sides still disagreed on forming committees for cross-border exchanges, on replacing the Armistice Treaty with a peace regime and opening each other's television and radio channels, he said.

North Korean officials at the third closed-door working-level contact at the truce village of Panmunjom Wednesday said they will not oppose a South Korean proposal to include the clause in the agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchange and cooperation, the source said.

They strongly opposed the proposal at the last contact Nov. 11.

The proposed clause says South and North Korea will remove all nuclear, chemical, biological and any other weapons of mass destruction from the Korean peninsula before pursuing military scaleback.

South and North Korea, divided since 1945, agreed in an inter-Korean prime ministers' meeting last month that they will adopt an agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchange and cooperation and have been holding working-level contacts to settle details of the agreement.

While South Korea neither confirms nor denies presence of American nuclear weapons in the South, North Korea is believed to own biological and chemical arsenal.

The clause, South Korea proposed, should be included in the agreement.

"North Korea said it will not oppose to this clause on condition that the U.S. withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from South Korea is proven as a true fact," the source said.

The two sides, however, still differed on other major points of differences, according to the source.

Seoul says the two sides should form a committee on cross-border travel, trade and communication while the North insists a subcommittee is enough.

Seoul insists on specifying the terms of reunions of separated families such as exchange of letters and visits in the agreement and arranging the reunions immediately after adopting the inter-Korean accord.

Next working-level contact is set for Nov. 26 at Panmunjom.

EC Welcomes No Tae-u's Non-Nuclear Declaration

SK2111032591 Seoul YONHAP in English 0147 GMT
21 Nov 91

[Text] Brussels, Nov. 20 (YONHAP)—The European Community (EC) Wednesday welcomed South Korean President No Tae-u's recent non-nuclear Korean peninsula peace initiatives and urged North Korea to sign and

implement safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without further delay and preconditions.

"President No's statement provides an important reaffirmation that South Korea will stand by its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty," The EC said in a statement.

The statement said No's Nov. 8 declaration represented important confidence building measures on the Korean peninsula and called on North Korea to respond positively to No's declaration.

No Tae-u To Verify Nuclear Pullout by Jan

SK2111033291 Seoul YONHAP in English 0232 GMT 21 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 21 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-u is likely to declare that South Korea is free of nuclear arms when U.S. President George Bush visits Seoul Jan. 5-7, a government source said Thursday.

Nuclear weapons deployed in Korea by the U.S. forces would be pulled out within the year before "international diplomatic efforts go into full swing to force North Korea to stop nuclear arms development," the source said, asking not to be identified by name or title.

No may make the declaration in a joint news conference to wind up Bush's two-day visit.

The two allies have a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear warheads in South Korea, but it is generally believed that the United States has nuclear arms in Korea.

Bush's planned visit to Seoul was the last in a series of steps designed to get North Korea to stop developing nuclear arms before launching all-out international efforts in the diplomatic front, the source said.

If North Korea refuses to scrap its nuclear reprocessing facilities even after No officially states that there are no nuclear weapons in the South, forcible means may be used by the U.N. Security Council and other international organizations, he said.

The governors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in February will serve as a forum for deciding how to apply sanctions to North Korea, the source said.

Foreign minister Yi Sang-ok said Wednesday that Seoul could announce the absence of nuclear arms "in the not distant future" if Bush's Sept. 27 promise of nuclear reduction was carried out as planned.

In his Nov. 8 declaration of "non-nuclear Korean peninsula peace initiatives," No said South Korea "will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons" or nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities.

North Korea is believed to be nearly or already capable of producing an atomic bomb. The hard-line communist government joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in 1985 but has not yet signed a nuclear safeguards accord with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] as an NPT signatory is required to do within 18 months of joining.

Response to North Nuclear Proposal Delayed

SK2711091091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0850 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 27 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea, due to differences in opinion among officials, delayed making an official response to North Korea's newest nuclear proposal Wednesday but said it contained notable shifts in attitude.

North Korea's statement Monday did not propose anything new and attached unrelated conditions to its signing of a nuclear safeguards accord, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

"We do note that the statement suggests possibility of North Korea's attitudinal changes," the Ministry said.

"Review and negotiations are under way within the government on the statement and an official position will be announced as soon as it is determined," it said.

A four-point proposal announced by the North Korean Foreign Ministry said Pyongyang would sign a nuclear safeguards accord when the United States began to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the South.

It called for simultaneous inspection of nuclear facilities in North Korea and a search for nuclear weapons in South Korea; Pyongyang-Washington negotiations on this simultaneous inspection and removal of the nuclear threat against North Korea; and Pyongyang-Seoul talks on making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

The Ministry delayed issuing an official statement after a hastily arranged working-level meeting of government officials.

Ministry sources said the delay was caused by disagreement on how to respond to North Korea's call for simultaneous inspection.

It would take "a few more days" before the government could produce a final statement, one source said.

North, South Stances on Nuclear Issue Viewed

SK2811123991 Seoul HANGYORE, SINMUN in Korean 27 Nov 91 p 3

[By Hong Su-won, editorial staff, from the column "Morning Rays": "Bubbling Over Nuclear Weapons at Home and Abroad"]

[Text] Roughly three years have passed since North Korea's nuclear development suddenly caught our attention around the time Korea hosted the 1988 Summer Olympics. It has repeatedly come back when we were about to forget about it, and then went away. It has visited us frequently since the end of last year.

Some say that North Korea's nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, said to be under construction, will be completed by 1995, claiming that they have reliable evidence to back their theory, while others say that these facilities will be completed much sooner than thought, by 1993. According to intelligence agencies and foreign newspapers bubbling over quotes from nuclear specialists, North Korea was first believed to be only one or two years away from producing its own atomic bombs comparable to the one dropped on Hiroshima; some even have suggested that it is not a matter of years, but of months.

What about today? In the space of the last couple of months, the United States announced that it will take back and destroy almost all of its tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad. In the meantime, North Korea put forward a proposal for adopting a South-North joint declaration to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, a revised version of an earlier proposal; and South Korea declared a non-nuclear policy based on the U.S. announcement of a nuclear arms reduction plan. Nevertheless, the alarm noisily went off throughout Northeast Asia, whose suspicion about North Korea's nuclear development is not much different in tone. Contrary to appearances, the alarm is still strongly tinged with an appeasement through the use of force rather than a compromise through negotiations.

At a time when many people, particularly the U.S. Congress, strongly favor force, such as imposed inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities by international organizations or the use of force to make North Korea abandon its nuclear development, officials at the U.S. Defense and State Departments, pretending that they have not heard these voices, emphatically claim that they have opted to intensify diplomatic pressure. They even play innocent. They suggested that if their plan for withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea is doubted, they would think about letting an international supervisory team inspect U.S. military bases in South Korea to verify their withdrawal. Moreover, the South side gives a completely unfeasible reply to North Korea's call for simultaneous nuclear inspections in the South and North, saying that it will place not only the nuclear weapons, but also all manner of military facilities under inspection if the North agrees to let in nuclear inspectors, while simultaneously calling it an unreasonable proposal. These moves by the government are aimed at driving away the opposing side, while justifying its scheme with empty appeasements. Counter proposals only make people wonder if the government is not following a course already charted.

The fuss over nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula, which appears to be very tangled, is caused by the combined desire of Korea and the United States to have a nuclear umbrella and unharmed passage of nuclear weapons through Korean territory and to remove the nuclear threat, from which North Korea hopes for some kind of compensation. The nuclear umbrella that Korea would not easily give up can be guaranteed as an outside deterrent. However, Korea needs to agree to what is known as unharmed passage of nuclear-bearing military aircraft and vessels through its territory and territorial air space and waters to make such an outside deterrent more effective. It is generally understood that a country must obtain implicit or explicit consent from a host nation for the unharmed passage of its military aircraft and vessels through the territories, territorial air space, and waters of the host nation. Otherwise, under no international laws can any nation claim the right to move its nuclear weapons through their territories, territorial air space, and waters, arguing that the nuclear weapons are harmless. What makes the South's non-nuclear policy controversial is that the policy is similar to Japanese policy: The passage of U.S. nuclear weapons through its territory is discussed in advance in order to make U.S. nuclear umbrella more effective.

Because the North's primary objective is the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, it has put forward a variety of proposals to expedite the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and the ensuing verification. In spite of all this, what it genuinely hopes to achieve is not so much a verification as sitting face to face with the United States at a negotiating table. There is no question that at this negotiating table North Korea will try to yank a guarantee for the removal of nuclear threats from the United States.

Nonetheless, North Korea should actively try to discuss the "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula," which now more than ever appears to have a greater chance of success in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, at the South-North high-level talks. We have heard a rumor that the two sides have agreed in principle to discuss the removal of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, at the four rounds of contacts at Panmunjom between the delegations of the South and North, held in camera, inflating our hope for the fifth round of the South-North high-level talks scheduled for December.

On the other hand, the recent "nuclear commotion" has given a moral boost to hard-liners in our society. We must guard against them, because we are constantly hearing people assert that whether to continue not only the material exchanges between the South and North, which are growing every year, but also the high-level talks, should be decided by linking them to the suspicion about North Korea's nuclear development project and its refusal to agree to nuclear inspection.

U.S. Begins Withdrawal of Nuclear Weapons

SK2811013691 Seoul YONHAP in English 0114 GMT
28 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 28 (YONHAP)—The United States has begun to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and will inform North Korea of the ongoing withdrawal shortly, government sources said Thursday.

North Korea's announcement on nuclear weapons Monday prompted the two allies to advance the schedule for removing nuclear arms deployed with the U.S. Forces in Korea, the sources said.

Seoul and Washington have reportedly agreed to pull U.S. nuclear arms out of Korea by the end of the year and declare their non-existence at the time of U.S. President George Bush's visit Jan. 5-7.

In Monday's announcement, North Korea signalled flexibility by saying it would sign the safeguards accord of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when the United States "begins to withdraw" its nuclear weapons. This is a change from Nov. 12, when it said it would sign the accord if the United States "actually withdraws" its nuclear weapons.

The South Korean Government planned to issue an official comment on the North's Nov. 25 announcement but postponed it for "full consultations" with the United States and other friendly countries, the sources said.

In drawing up the official comment, the government will consider an IAEA Governors' meeting slated for Dec. 5, where visible measures such as a special inspection of North Korea's nuclear capability are likely to be sought, the sources said.

"With President Bush's Sept. 27 announcement to cut short-range nuclear arms and President No Tae-u's Nov. 8 declaration on a non-nuclear Korea, the tactical U.S. nuclear weapons have been virtually withdrawn," one official said.

The official said it was difficult for him to tell when the withdrawal began because of the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons, "but our government can confirm the withdrawal."

The pullout could be completed within a short period of time "as it does not require special procedures or means," he said.

There would be no problem in completely removing U.S. nuclear arms only if North Korea realized the will to sign the IAEA accord expressed in its Nov. 25 announcement, the official said.

The South Korean Government, while recognizing the North's intention to sign the accord, will strongly demand it open its nuclear facilities to outside inspection, the sources said.

The government would also make efforts to secure international support and reasonable ground to seek tough punitive actions, in case the North failed to comply, they said.

If the North accepts international inspection, the South may allow it to inspect U.S. military facilities in Korea as part of arms reduction talks for South-North Korean confidence building, the sources said.

In the four-point proposal announced Monday, the North Korean Foreign Ministry said Pyongyang would sign a nuclear safeguards accord when the United States began to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the South.

It called for simultaneous inspection of nuclear facilities in North Korea and a search for nuclear weapons in South Korea; Pyongyang-Washington negotiations on the simultaneous inspection and removal of the nuclear threat against North Korea; and Pyongyang-Seoul talks on making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

'Appropriate Action' Promised on Nuclear Plans

SK3011025091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0239 GMT
30 Nov 91

[Text] Seoul, Nov. 30 (YONHAP)—South Korea will take "appropriate action" in the nearest future to follow up on nuclear initiatives announced by U.S. President George Bush and South Korean President No Tae-u. Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok said Saturday.

Seoul and Washington were discussing details of the U.S. and Korean initiatives, and it was difficult to say when the nuclear withdrawal from Korea would be completed. Yi told a news conference.

"At an appropriate time in the nearest future, we will be able to take an action," he said, suggesting the U.S. nuclear pullout will be carried out at a fast pace.

"We will consider declaring non-presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea at an appropriate time as well," Yi said.

Seoul and Washington are holding consultations on overall securities arrangements on the Korean peninsula, and the matter was discussed at the 23rd Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting here earlier this month, the foreign minister said.

North Korea is unpredictable and it is uncertain whether it will sign a nuclear safeguards accord by next February, when the directors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are to meet.

"We believe that given the overall political development, North Korea will have to change its policy. We will be carefully watching North Korea's reaction at the IAEA governors' meeting Dec. 5-6, and inter-Korean prime ministers' talks," Yi said.

Next week's IAEA meeting would be too short to discuss North Korea's nuclear development but the topic might

be raised when the meeting addressed nuclear inspection in Brazil and Argentina, Yi told the press conference.

He refused to link the inter-Korean prime ministers' talks with North Korea's nuclear program.

"We must simultaneously pursue effective progress in inter-Korean dialogue and deterrence of North Korea's nuclear arms development. Forestalling dialogue over nuclear controversy is not an effective method," Yi said.

"South Korea does plan to demand at the fifth inter-Korean prime ministers' talks next month that North Korea receive immediate inspection of its nuclear facilities," he said.

The foreign minister denied that either Seoul or Washington was considering military action to stop North Korea's nuclear arms program.

"Suggestions of military alternatives were not made by U.S. policymakers, and we are not considering it either. We are opting for all available diplomatic and political solutions," he said.

NEW ZEALAND

Minister on Regional Attitude to Antinuclear Line

BK1411143191 Hong Kong AFP in English 0800 GMT 18 Nov 91

[Text] Wellington, Nov 18 (AFP)—Japan is embarrassed at New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy while Australia is frustrated at it, Foreign Minister Don McKinnon has reportedly told members of the ruling National Party.

But he said his government was too unpopular to deal with the issue by way of a referendum, in an address given this month to each of the party's five regional divisions, the NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION (NZPA) said Monday.

NZPA said it had obtained "comprehensive notes" taken by somebody present at one of the behind-closed-doors meetings.

Legislation passed by the previous Labour Government outlawed nuclear weapons and nuclear power here in 1987, leading to the effective ending of the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) military pact.

Washington saw the policy as compromising its policy of neither confirming nor denying the existence of nuclear weapons on U.S. ships and aircraft.

While in opposition Prime Minister Jim Bolger promised to retain the law but he then announced a review of it earlier this year, after U.S. President George Bush announced the removal of nuclear weapons from surface ships.

McKinnon, who has always argued for closer ties with the United States, told the meetings the implications of the stand-off involved foreign policy and trade.

Substantial pressure was being applied on Wellington diplomatically to scrap the legislation, he said, noting that a New Zealand request to join a meeting on Pacific security with the United States, Canada, Japan and Australia in Anchorage, Alaska, was refused, though South Korea's application was accepted.

McKinnon said Australia was seeking to join the North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, the United States and Mexico and was making it very clear in Washington that New Zealand, because of its detached security posture, did not belong in such an arrangement.

Australia found it costly and frustrating to deal with New Zealand and the United States at separate levels in the defence and intelligence areas, McKinnon said.

Japan was greatly embarrassed by New Zealand's stance on nuclear ship visits and had forbidden former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer to raise the matter during a brief visit to Japan last year, he charged.

Britain was no longer as helpful as it had been over butter access to the European Community and McKinnon said he had been told by the New Zealand Dairy Board that it was finding it much harder to negotiate with the United States.

However he said that any referendum on what to do with the anti-nuclear policy would be clouded by the government's present unpopularity.

While Bush's recent decision to remove nuclear weapons from surface naval vessels was welcome, its timing could hardly be worse from a domestic political point of view, McKinnon said.

But while the government wished the issue could have been left on the back-burner until at least 1993, after the next election, it had to be addressed.

McKinnon said the window of opportunity might not remain open for long and the government had to make the sort of response New Zealand's traditional allies expected of it soon, or risk seeing the country consigned, perhaps permanently, to irrelevance.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Soviet, CSFR Aldes Lebedev Discuss Troop Damage Claims

*LD1911030191 Prague CSTK in English 1820 GMT
18 Nov 91*

[Text] Prague Nov 18 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier and Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Aleksandr Lebedev met today to discuss ongoing negotiations on financial compensation for damage caused by the Soviet Army during its 23-year occupation of Czechoslovakia.

They agreed that high-level officials from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry will meet soon in Prague to discuss the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and disarmament.

They also talked about ways for Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union to help ease the fighting in Yugoslavia.

They discussed a possible December date for a planned visit to Czechoslovakia by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty.

INDIA

Papers Comment on Superpower Arms Initiatives

Strategic Missile Reduction Needed

92WC00234 Calcutta THE SUNDAY STATESMAN
in English 13 Oct 91 p 6

[Editorial: "Arms and the Men"]

[Text] Mr George Bush deserves the international applause that followed his decision unilaterally to strip the USA of its tactical nuclear weapons, reduce the alert level of its bombers, and scrap plans for new mobile strategic missiles. It is the style rather than the substance of his proposal that deserves praise. Disarmament in the past moved at a glacial pace and fell victim to petty political squabbles that made the process a task worthy of Sisyphus. Mr Bush understood that the post-Cold War era allowed him the gamble of unilateral cuts. He would face little domestic opposition and could expect an equal Soviet reaction. The speed and simplicity of his cut, designed to put disarmament on the fast lane, was necessitated by the primary motive behind the move—the "loose-nukes" threat. Simply put, both Washington and Moscow are having nightmares at the thought of thousands of small, battlefield nuclear weapons scattered across a Soviet Union whose central authority is slipping daily. A recent and fortunately unsuccessful raid by Azeri rebels on a Soviet nuclear depot drove home the point that nothing could be more destabilizing than the existence of a scruffy guerrilla armed with zealous nationalism and atomic bombs.

Time is of the essence. A unilateral cut is the best means to provide the impetus for speedy disarmament. It is also true that the West's tactical nuclear weapons, designed to fend off a Soviet land invasion of Western Europe, had become redundant. But common sense has never been the governing principle of the nuclear arms race. In addition, the drama of Mr Bush's proposal was a nice filip to a man about to face a fickle electorate next year. Mr Mikhail Gorbachev could not help being anything but gratified at Mr Bush's proposal. After all, he has been pushing for a reduction in the Soviet nuclear arsenal almost from the day he became top man in the Kremlin. He is also fearful of wrong weapons in wrong hands. In addition, it must have been pleasant to be reminded that, for the West, he is still the man to talk to in Moscow.

Mr Gorbachev, in fact, has tossed the ball back into Mr Bush's court. The Soviet response not only matched the Americans on tactical weapons, but treaded where the White House had feared to trend—the planet-threatening strategic missile arsenals. Here, Mr Gorbachev said, his country would cut a thousand more missiles than it is required to do under the START. It is not that Mr Bush did not touch on the strategic weapons systems. But what he did was more in keeping with Cold War-style arms negotiations. By cancelling plans for two mobile land-based strategic missiles, he invited the

Soviet Union to do the same for the same class of missiles. However, the Soviet strategic force consists almost overwhelmingly of land-based missiles. The USA depends more on submarine-launched missiles and Mr Bush did not touch them.

Mr Gorbachev's announcement that he would be mothballing a number of Soviet nuclear submarines as well as scrapping some land-based missiles is a clear sign that he expects the USA to start chipping at the submarine core of its nuclear deterrent. The world can breathe easier, especially as the two sides have moved to curtail some of the less dependable remnants of the balance of terror—the bombers, the multiple warheads, the tactical weapons—but until something is done about the strategic missiles, the spectre of a nuclear war will remain. Mr Gorbachev proposed talks to cut strategic arsenals by half; the door lies open and Mr Bush should not hesitate to walk in.

Test Ban, Nonnuclear Missiles Needed

92WC00234 Madras INDIAN EXPRESS in English
8 Oct 91 p 8

[Editorial: Towards a Safer World"]

[Text] Nuclear disarmament has received a fresh thrust so soon after the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed in July. President Bush's unilateral proposals of September 27 have evoked an expected positive response from Moscow within 10 days. The main significance of the unilateral American cuts into or deactivation of tactical nuclear weapons and the Soviet decision to take reciprocal steps with regard to its own deployment of this part of the nuclear arsenal lies in the fact that they have met an urgent mutual need. Mr Bush was worried that the Soviet tactical nukes, far more widely dispersed than the strategic weapons, might fall into wrong hands given the political instability in the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that Mr Gorbachev and Mr Yeltsin were equally interested in averting such a danger. The unilateral American decision was meant to make it easier for the Soviet duo to withstand possible resistance from the military hierarchy and to effect matching cuts in their own tactical nukes on a priority basis.

While this is welcome, the more important gain is that in the process of meeting an immediate exigency, Washington and Moscow have stepped up scaling down of the strategic nuclear arsenal, too. Responding to Mr Bush's action in this regard, Mr Gorbachev has announced that he will scrap plans to make new launchers for ICBMs on rail cars and for modernising them. He will also remove from day-to-day alert status 503 ICBMs including 134 ones with multiple individually targeted warheads. On the whole, the Soviet President has committed himself to more sweeping cuts in strategic offensive weapons than strictly required under START.

Despite the immense importance of all these measures, it is still difficult to hail them as constituting a leap forward

towards creating a safer world. There must be credible progress in two respects if such optimism is to seem justified. First, the US must shed its rigid opposition to a ban on nuclear tests. Mr Gorbachev has announced a one-year moratorium on such tests. An alternative to such a step towards an absolute ban could be an agreed annual quota of tests. Secondly, the two possessors of awesome nuclear arsenals will need to cooperate in developing a non-nuclear anti-missile system if they are to rid the world completely of the nuclear nightmare.

Most Heavy Weapons Retained

92WC0023A Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English
9 Oct 91 p 8

[Editorial: "A New Peace Offensive"]

[Text] For 40 years, the two superpowers raised the nuclear stakes, building their toys of death and edging towards an Armageddon. In the bipolar world of bitter global rivalry, safety lay in numbers: more weapons, with more warheads, meant peace, though of the grave. Superpower negotiations on arms limitation began as well-intentioned attempts, fading into public-relations exercises. Nuclear missiles, arms experts concluded, had kept the peace: they were necessary evils. Only recently, after the Berlin Wall crumbled and President Mikhail Gorbachev took his troops out of Eastern Europe, did the cold warriors of the world realise that the nuclear genie was more evil than necessary. As the permafrost of four decades of superpower hostility thawed, came the first indications of the peace dividend: the Reagan-Gorbachev INF treaty (dismissed by hardliners like US conservative William F. Buckley Jr. as a "nuclear Munich") and then, agreements on conventional weapons cuts and the START treaty. The visions of nuclear winter, a world shrouded by radioactive dust, seem far-fetched today. Plans of defeating the "evil empire" in a limited nuclear war have been quietly shelved by the Pentagon in the face of President Gorbachev's peace offensive. With the infrastructure of fear being dismantled, the international peace movement is collapsing.

Recent cuts in the nuclear arsenals ensure that fewer fingers rest on the nuclear triggers; there are also fewer weapons of destruction. Now, no Strangelovian figure can start an accidental war. Bush's initiative ensures that his strategic bombers are no longer on high-alert; his tactical nuclear weapons, arrayed in Europe to stop a Soviet blitzkrieg through central Germany towards the English Channel, will be destroyed; there will be fewer weapons including the nuclear-tipped Cruise and Tomahawk missiles, known for their pin-point accuracy; and the deadly MX missiles, affectionately called "Peace-keeper" by Ronald Reagan, will not be built. They are all significant steps, involving substantial savings, which will help the cash-strapped United States. But as usual, it is President Gorbachev who has proposed the deeper cuts. After matching Mr Bush's proposals and more, the Soviet President has proposed a one-year moratorium on

nuclear testing, and has decided to stop the development of new missiles. Though the Soviet threat has receded, Mr Bush, surrounded by men of caution, has so far chosen not to go further, preferring the safety of the Strategic Defence Initiative, better known as the Star Wars system, which will take years to develop and deploy. Mr Gorbachev's offer of jointly developing SDI is laudable; it will cut costs, and the sharing of technology will provide a safety net of its own. But the Americans, securely ahead in the race to build an anti-ICBM system with laser beams and "smart rocks," may refuse to reconsider. More understandable is the decision to continue production of the hi-tech B2 Stealth bomber, a weapon of the future, which is being readied to replace the ageing B-52s. Despite the cuts, both countries still retain most of their heavy weapons—the intercontinental ballistic missiles—based both on submarines and concrete reinforced silos. Even today, both countries still possess enough weapons to blow up the world many times over. And it is perhaps this that both Mr Bush and Mr Gorbachev will have to keep in mind when their arms control experts begin negotiating for START II. Otherwise, the shadow of Hiroshima will loom over civilisation.

Need for Delhi Policy Review

92WC0023A Madras INDIAN EXPRESS in English
1 Oct 91 p 10

[Editorial: "A Significant Initiative"]

[Text] Every landmark change in Soviet policy has given a major impetus to nuclear disarmament. The Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty followed striking departures by President Gorbachev from anti-US confrontation. Although, unlike these two treaties, the latest American decision on sweeping cuts in short-range nuclear weapons is unilateral, it, too, is a direct sequel to the failure of the Soviet communist hardliners' coup in August. President Bush has obviously inferred that since the Soviet reformists led by Mr Gorbachev and Mr Boris Yeltsin have now entrenched themselves, the fear of a Soviet attack with short-range nuclear weapons or even a conventional attack on targets in Western Europe can be safely discounted. A sweeping reduction in tactical nuclear weapons deployed in and around Europe is, for instance, the core of Mr Bush's initiative. He has asked Mr Gorbachev for reciprocity. He seems to have in mind a positive response particularly to the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons including Tomahawk cruise missiles from submarines and ships. The well-known Soviet refusal to remove its tactical SS-18 missiles, aimed at Western Europe, has hitherto been attributed to the presence of sea-borne US missiles. Mr Bush naturally expects that with the removal of these American missiles, Mr Gorbachev should have no reason to hesitate to do away with the SS-18 missiles. But apart from military logic, what has obviously made Mr Bush optimistic of the desired Soviet shift is the elimination of the hardline

opponents of Mr Gorbachev from crucial perches especially those in the military establishment.

Will the world be substantially safer from the nuclear danger as a result of the present American initiative? Armament experts are likely to differ on this matter. That, however, should be no reason for third-world countries, especially India, to pretend that the two major nuclear-weapons powers have shown no serious interest in putting an end to vertical nuclear armament and to insist that the latter, therefore, are not justified in pressing for horizontal nuclear non-proliferation. The US will now consider itself to be on stronger moral ground than before to intensify this pressure. Significantly, it has called for Soviet co-operation in this as well as in deterring the use of missiles developed or obtained by several countries in recent years. This development calls for a review of the entire disarmament policy so far pursued by New Delhi. The emphasis henceforth should be on the need to take a serious look at every proposal to promote nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia.

World Not Nuclear Free

92WC0023a New Delhi PATRIOT in English 9 Oct 91
p 4

[Editorial: "Big-power Nukes"]

[Text] The enormous political changes in the Soviet Union have made it possible to dispense with the unnecessary stockpiles of n-weapons of the US and the USSR. What has essentially prompted the two powers to make competing proposals for deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals is the fear, shared equally by both sides, that given the political instability in the Soviet Union, there is a real risk of strategic weapons falling into the wrong hands. Anxious to strike a deal before central authority in Moscow changes its character, President Bush made a unilateral proposal on September 27 to scrap short-range tactical nuclear weapons and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. The American President's proposals were a clever move to redress American disadvantages in the nuclear race vis-a-vis the Soviet Union without negotiating away any of its advantages. Not, surprisingly, the proposals were aimed at disarming the Soviet system: that most worry the US, namely, the MIRV and ICBMs and tactical nukes. Whereas the Soviet Union, being a land power, enjoyed clear numerical superiority in the case of the former and would thus be most affected by any such cuts in these weapon-systems, the latter proposal was inspired chiefly by the need to prevent accidental nuclear warfare. Removal of land-based tactical weapons would at the same time quell German anxiety about nuclear weapons on their soil. Significantly, submarine-based ICBMs in which the US enjoys numerical superiority were not included in the proposal. Cut-backs in other weapon systems were, similarly, carefully calculated tactical moves rather than any evidence of American magnanimity. Thus the cancellation of three development programmes, namely, the scheme to deploy the MX

missiles on railway tracks, the single-warhead mid-etman missile and the SRAM-2 air-to-ground nuclear missile might have been done with a view to pacifying the US Congress where these programmes had run into serious trouble. By conceding on this, President Bush may be trying to ease the passage through the Congress of two other controversial projects—the B-2 bomber and the space-based anti-missile defences. There is no doubt that President Bush's unilateral moves constitute a step forward towards nuclear disarmament. Unilateral action has made it easier for President Gorbachev to fend off resistance from the military hierarchy, as was the case with START. Expectedly, therefore, President Gorbachev has not merely matched the American President's initiative with his own but even surpassed him by proposing more sweeping cuts in strategic weapons. Besides announcing cuts in number of warheads from tactical missiles, destruction of some 'Zenith' missiles as well as destruction of tactical weapons from ships and multi-purpose sub-marines, Mr Gorbachev has proposed cuts and full liquidation on a reciprocal basis of all tactical naval arms. The Soviet Union has also announced an immediate one year moratorium of nuclear weapons tests. Nevertheless, the proposals still fall short of promising the dawn of a nuclear free world.

ISRAEL

Ministry Approves Development of Superlasers

TA2611150191 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ
in Hebrew 26 Nov 91 p 1

[Report by Yavsham 'Azgad]

[Excerpts] Professor Yuval Ne'eman, minister of energy and infrastructure and of science and technology, has approved a project for the development of superlasers, laser beams that utilize free electrons. The project, to be headed by Professor Avi Gover of Tel Aviv University's Engineering Department, will be conducted jointly with the Weizmann Institute and other research institutions. Recent immigrant Soviet scientists will also participate.

The overall cost of the project is estimated at approximately \$300,000. The Energy and Infrastructure Ministry will finance half that sum, and the rest will be defrayed by the Israel Academy of Sciences and the Israel-U.S. Binational Science Foundation (BSF). The cost is far lower than normally allocated to such projects in other places in the world, one reason being the plan to use existing installations and to convert them for the current project.

The free electron laser beam is seen as the best candidate to replace the "death beam" planned to eliminate enemy missiles in the U.S. SDI ("Star Wars") project. Scientists also hope to use the laser for the ignition of nuclear fusion reactors. [passage omitted]

The Israeli superlaser will apparently be based on an existing electrostatic particle accelerator at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot. This 6-million-watt horizontal accelerator has been virtually unused recently. Commensurate with its power, the Israeli superlaser is planned to deflect laser millimeter and infrared waves (it takes an accelerator with greater power to generate a shorter wave beam). Since the said accelerator is electrostatic, it deflects a continuous beam rather than separate pulses. That is why the superlaser based on the accelerator will have a high efficiency in converting electric

energy into light, a higher beam coherence, and a high average power. This type of laser could be used for the ignition of fusion reactors (and less so for similar military usage planned for "Star Wars.")

According to the plans, development work will start this January and will last nearly three years. In the first stage, the installation will serve for laser research. Later, it could be used in other areas, such as materials research, biology, isotope separation, etc.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Commentary On Soviet-U.S. Disarmament Talks

LD2611160391 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] The Soviet-American consultations on disarmament are underway in Washington. There is substantive talk on the reciprocal initiatives of the United States and the USSR presidents concerning simultaneous unilateral cuts in nuclear arsenals. Now a commentary prepared by Yuriy Solton.

When consultations started on Monday [25 November], George Bush forwarded to the American Senate for ratification the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms signed in Moscow last July. The accord provides for reducing the strategic nuclear forces of the two countries by approximately 35 percent. In his message to the Senate, the President stressed that a stable balance in the strategic arms of the Soviet Union and the United States will help to strengthen one of the fundamental principles of a new world order. According to this postulate, any conflict must not be resolved by nuclear arms. Moscow accepts such a view and offers to go further. In keeping with the treaty, each of the two countries are to be left with 6,000 nuclear warheads. Mikhail Gorbachev suggests that this level should be brought down to 5,000 pieces. To reciprocate Washington's steps, Moscow is taking off ready for combat mode heavy bombers and 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles. It's stopping the development of a mobile small intercontinental missile and has imposed a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing. Measures are being adopted to implement decisions that lead to the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Regrettably, now when the former USSR is nonexistent and a new union is only in the making, unforeseen difficulties are emerging [words indistinct] to put disarmament programs into effect. The ratification of the treaties is being delayed. There are also problems with the practical liquidation of nuclear warheads, since this requires considerable spending and the country can hardly afford meeting even its vital needs. But these difficulties, as it seems, can be overcome. American aid already approved by the Senate will provide significant support. United States legislators have set aside \$500 million for technical assistance to the Soviet Union to scrap its battlefield nuclear weapons.

But naturally the main hopes are being pinned in this country on the creation of a new confederative democratic State, a union of sovereign states. The draft of a Union treaty to be sent to the parliaments of republics for debate this week envisages the retention of single armed forces and single control over nuclear arms. This control will be exercised by a president elected by all the people and by the other bodies of central power. All this confirms that Moscow will observe all its earlier arms

reduction commitments and the process of disarmament will continue. The Soviet-American consultations in Washington are just called upon to determine the concrete framework of this process and pave the way for closer cooperation between the two countries.

Latest U.S. Arms Talks End in Washington

LD2811110691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2344 GMT 27 Nov 91

[By Tass correspondent Stanislav Lunev]

[Text] Washington, 28 Nov (TASS)—The latest round in the Soviet-U.S. consultations on questions of arms limitation and reduction ended at the U.S. Department of State on 27 November. They continued the bilateral dialogue in this field between the USSR and United States begun in October of this year. The consultations were devoted to a broad set of disarmament questions, primarily based on U.S. President George Bush's initiatives of 27 September and those of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev of 5 October of this year. At the consultations, the Soviet side was led by Aleksey Obukhov, USSR deputy minister of external relations, and the U.S. side by Reginald Bartholomew, U.S. under secretary of state. In the Soviet delegation were representatives of four sovereign republics: Belarus [Belorussia], Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine.

In a conversation with the TASS correspondent after the consultations at the U.S. Department of State, Aleksey Obukhov said that they primarily concerned questions of implementation of counterinitiatives of the Soviet and U.S. Presidents in the field of nuclear disarmament. The discussions confirmed the two sides' resolution to fulfill entirely the measures announced by the two countries' presidents, directed at further reducing the Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals on the basis of following a good example and parallel steps. A number of specific questions were also examined, arising from the counterinitiatives of the leaders of the two countries, including those concerning the methods of liquidating nuclear weapons, safe handling of nuclear charges, and strengthening nuclear safety.

As during the first round of consultations in this field, which was held in Moscow at the beginning of October, the USSR deputy minister of external relations stressed, discussion of all the questions was characterized by a spirit of openness and frankness, and by both sides' desire to find practical ways of further reducing superfluous military structures and strengthening strategic stability. A major constructive contribution to the discussion was made by the representatives of the sovereign republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine, who took part in the consultations. On completion of the consultations at the U.S. State Department, the sides agreed that the discussions in this field will be continued, and the specific forms, dates, and subject matter of these discussions will be agreed on through diplomatic channels.

GENERAL

Quality of Nuclear Arms Debate Questioned

PM1411160591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 12 Nov 91 First Edition p 2

[G. Khromov "Rejoinder": "No Need To Scare Us"]

[Text] On 19 October this year former USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and "political scientist" Olshevskiy gave a television interview about the reliability of our nuclear weapons. This was done with the utmost lack of professionalism, and many viewers who still trust ministers (even if they are former ministers) got the impression that there is a very high probability of a nuclear apocalypse's occurring very soon.

And here is another example. Recently one of our lofty leaders, when listing the republics where strategic nuclear weapons are located (and this is known from the Soviet-U.S. Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaty), forgot to name one of them. What are we to think about the republic which has been "forgotten?" The answer is natural enough: The republic is not trusted and without its agreement is being deprived of the "nuclear umbrella," while the nuclear weapons which are now located on its territory are being moved somewhere else!

What is the upshot? That pronouncements by professional military personnel and engineers on nuclear weapons are currently drowning in a sea of incompetent publications in the Soviet and foreign mass media by third-rate homegrown specialists. It has reached a point where public pronouncements have been made containing fantastic and provocative suppositions about the possibility of an interrepublic exchange of nuclear missile strikes.

Maybe that's enough of scaring each other? Maybe it is time to deny dilettantes and people with sick imaginations the opportunity of publishing items on very delicate and important questions?

It is time for reason to triumph.

Rear Admiral Views Changed Strategic Role

PM1811113991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Nov 91 First Edition p 3

["Viewpoint" by Rear Admiral Yu. Korshunov, doctor of naval sciences and professor: "Within the Framework of Military Cooperation"]

[Text] It is now several years since a defensive military doctrine was proclaimed in the Soviet Union. Definite steps are being taken to implement it: Troop numbers

are being cut, certain kinds of weapons are being eliminated, and conversion is gradually, albeit very slowly, developing within the defense industry. Nonetheless, a great deal remains unclear. Two main questions above all remain unanswered: First, who is the enemy against whom we intend to defend ourselves, and, second, for what specific purpose and to perform what functions should our Armed Forces be developed in the new conditions?

Until recently everything seemed clear in this area. The United States and its allies were the enemies. In military circles they were not described as anything but the "probable enemy." The main principles of our military organizational development were also obvious. The Army and Navy as a whole, and also their individual components, were developed so as to guarantee superiority over or at least parity with the "probable enemy." But what now?

In principle anyone with a military-industrial potential bigger than or comparable to ours could pose a threat to our security. Today and in the foreseeable future that still means the United States and its allies. But is an armed conflict possible between the USSR and the former "probable enemy"? Virtually not. Whether we like it or not, M. Thatcher is right—strategic nuclear missile weapons are today the main factor precluding a clash between the two military superpowers. Incidentally, the following question is logical here: Can the USSR and the United States be considered probable enemies at all? The response will most probably be negative. It is more correct to say, I think, that we are involuntary partners in a kind of nuclear missile "embrace."

Hence the first function of our Armed Forces, in my view, is to maintain the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear potential. It is quite obvious that what I have said is also directly relevant to the corresponding U.S. and NATO forces. There is no getting away from it, history has this kind of "military cooperation" with the civilized world in store for us. Should we try to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation? Of course we should! But that is primarily politicians' concern. It is up to the military to keep their powder dry, so to speak.

Nonetheless, a peace based solely on mutual threat, on a kind of nuclear missile embrace between the two superpowers is a prospect with little attraction for mankind. The question arises: Can there not be other forms of military cooperation—cooperation in the direct sense of the word—with our former "probable enemy"? I think that there can.

Let us try to discuss them. No one would be so bold today as to claim that Husayn was the last aggressor to challenge the world community. It proved possible to bar his way only thanks to military efforts on the part of the majority of developed countries. I think that military cooperation between the USSR and the United States and its allies must above all preclude the possibility of

such aggressors appearing. This task can be accomplished by creating combined international forces—forces capable of curbing any potential aggressor. Our Armed Forces' second main function could be to take a direct, active part in these forces.

It is quite obvious that combined international forces would take action only on the basis of a UN mandate. The size and composition of these forces would depend on the specific situation prevailing in the world. Naturally, these international forces must perform all their tasks with conventional weapons alone.

As an illustration, let us try to concretize this idea in relation to one branch of our Armed Forces—the Navy. What tasks should the Navy perform within the framework of the proposed functions, what will its activity consist of, and what forces must it possess for this?

The first function is nuclear missile confrontation. In the Navy it is performed by nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Their task is to be on permanent duty in combat patrol areas. U.S., British, and French missile submarines perform a similar task. On both sides nuclear missile submarine combat patrols are supported by multipurpose submarines, surface ships, and other forces. In an endeavor to reconnoiter combat patrol areas each side regularly sends its systems there. It is always very dangerous when they come into direct contact with nuclear missile submarines and their support systems. One partial but extremely important task in the overall problem of reducing the level of nuclear confrontation is to reduce this kind of contact.

The second function is involvement in international forces for curbing aggressors. What forces will the Navy need to do that? Obviously, surface ships above all—missile ships, landing ships, and aircraft-carrying ships. Their composition, numbers, and tasks will be determined not only by the relevant international agreements but also by the country's economic potential. It cannot be denied that it would be unusual to join a common combat formation with our previous "probable enemy" and sail a parallel course. Nevertheless, this is not only necessary but also a highly important step toward our integration into the world community.

Obviously, functions considered in a similar way could be detailed with regard to other branches of the armed forces. Ultimately they will determine the thrust of their development in line with our defensive doctrine.

One final point. Will the new functions help reduce spending on the armed forces? I think they will. After all, apart from a constant reduction in the level of nuclear missile confrontation, partnership with the United States and its allies in international forces will require considerably fewer funds than the previous unlimited rivalry with them.

Strategic Missile Forces Chief Interviewed

PM1911115391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Nov 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Army General Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces and USSR deputy defense minister, by Major A. Dolinin; date and place of interview not stated: "Army General Yu. Maksimov: Motherland's Missile Shield Should Preserve Reliability"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] On the eve of Missile Forces and Artillery Day our correspondent met with Army General Yuriy Pavlovich Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces and USSR deputy defense minister. The talk which took place, however, was by no means of a "festive" nature. It was devoted to the present and future of the Strategic Missile Forces and the missile men's complex problems.

[Dolinin] Yuriy Pavlovich, the positive changes in the military-political situation which have taken place in the world in recent years have substantially reduced the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. In this connection what are the role and function of our strategic nuclear forces under the new conditions?

[Maksimov] You are right: The threat of a world nuclear missile war and a wide-scale military conflict has now in practice been reduced to a minimum. But the positive changes in the military-political and military-strategic situation have by no means removed the problem of our country's security. Judge for yourself. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved yet the NATO bloc remains. The United States has not renounced its "from a position of strength" policy and is leading matters to the point where, to use G. Bush's expression, a new world order will be unipolar with a leading role for the United States on the basis of the conservation of its military and economic might. The main avenues of the improvement of the U.S. armed forces—the priority implementation of long-term programs for the development of strategic offensive arms and the continuation of work on the SDI program—also remain unchanged.

All this makes it possible to conclude that the military danger for our country has not ceased to be a reality. That means that together with political measures, it is sensible to resolve the task of preserving peace and preventing war on condition that military-strategic parity is maintained with a consideration for our state's course toward the substantial reduction of the level of military confrontation. A very important role here also belongs to the country's strategic nuclear forces, of which the Strategic Missile Forces are the basis.

[Dolinin] Right now the country's military-political leadership is studying new approaches toward building the Armed Forces. In your view, what changes will take place in the Strategic Missile Forces?

[Maksimov] You know that within the framework of the forthcoming reform it is proposed to create a system of Union and republic organs of defense. It is proposed to transfer to civilian ministries some of the functions of deciding defense questions. There will be a change in the branches of the Armed Forces and their tasks and organizational and staff structures. In practice many reform measures are already being implemented in the Missile Troops. There is the reduction of a number of formations and units, the abolition of the intermediate-range missiles—a whole class of missiles—the upgrading of a number of units to form complexes with better qualitative specifications, the reduction of the numerical strength of troops and organs of management... The implementation of the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation Treaty is next in line. And in the near future there will be the creation of a new type of armed forces—the strategic deterrent forces which in addition to other components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces will be based on the strategic missile forces.

The process of implementing military reform will be continued for quite a long time. Here there will be organizational and staff changes and it is planned to optimize the structure of management of troops and weapons. There will be an increase in their combat capability, mobility, tenacity, and ability to overcome ABM systems and strike targets with any degree of defense.

All this should ensure the maintenance of the existing military-strategic parity at a lower level and at the same time the missile forces' reliable solution of the tasks set for them.

[Dolinin] How will these radical changes affect the fate of the present missilemen?

[Maksimov] As of now we have virtually completed the deployment of officers released during the implementation of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The overwhelming majority have gone to swell the numbers in areas which are at present understaffed or have been appointed to posts in place of those who have been released into the reserve for reasons of age. All this work has been performed without serious rebukes from the officers. Not one of them has been released without pension rights and stipulated benefits, except for those who have discharged for failing to meet the requirements of their posts or who have received a dishonorable discharge. We have the firm conviction that during the implementation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms which has been signed, the fate of each officer will also be resolved with tact and attention.

At the same time I shall stress that as before we shall experience a great shortage of cadres for primary officers posts. That is why any arguments by a certain section of young officers and military school cadets of the missile forces to the effect that they cannot see any future in service are without foundation.

[Dolinin] But today voices are being heard increasingly frequently about the reduction of the strategic nuclear arms right up to their complete destruction.

[Maksimov] Indeed, an enormous nuclear potential has been accumulated in the world which could destroy everything living on earth many times over. Therefore, there is simply no alternative to its reduction, right up to its complete elimination. But here we must not forget the realities which have taken shape in the world. Primarily the balance of nuclear forces between the USSR and the United States and the other nuclear powers. This equilibrium can be destroyed both by the further arms race and by unilateral disarmament. After all it is dangerous not only to climb a steep hill but also to climb down.

In order in the future to reduce still further the threat of the outbreak of war it is essential to ensure strategic nuclear stability by preserving parity of forces. Here the level of nuclear arms should be reduced on a mutual basis. This is now being demonstrated by the United States and the USSR as states with the most powerful nuclear potential. Subsequently I hope that this process will also be joined by Britain and France. For instance, in the Strategic Missile Forces it is planned to make a 30 percent reduction to the number of missile launchers and a more than 50 percent reduction to the number of warheads over the course of seven years. Stationary missile complexes will be subject to reduction. Mobile complexes which ensure a high degree of tenacity in retaliatory actions, as most fully according with the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, do not come under this treaty.

[Dolinin] Political stability is also needed to preserve peace. But the collapse of the USSR is continuing. Will the declaration of state independence by a number of former union republics affect the fate of the country's strategic forces and the possibility of ratifying the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms?

[Maksimov] I am deeply convinced that only a renewed united Union and united Armed Forces of our state can ensure effective sovereignty, independence, and security both for the country as a whole and for each individual republic. On the other hand without the joint efforts of all republics it is impossible to retain a modern army, whose maintenance is no simple matter even for the Union. Still less is it within the economic powers of an individual republic. That is why my opinion of the fate of the strategic nuclear forces and in particular the missile forces is absolutely unequivocal: They must be united, remain for the time being within their existing grouping and be managed centrally. This is also mentioned in the resolution of the fifth Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in the November decision of the country's State Council. That is why in ratifying the strategic offensive arms treaty I believe there should be no substantial obstacles from the republics. Its ratification and implementation accords with their interests.

since it is one more step toward reducing the nuclear danger for all and the reduction of the level of military confrontation in the world.

We must also consider something else. The resolution of the fifth Congress of USSR People's Deputies instructed the country's president, Supreme Soviet, and State Council to ensure the continuity of power in the transitional period and to observe unconditionally all international agreements and commitments adopted by the USSR, including those on questions of arms reduction and control. So far our country has been and remains a united nuclear power and a single possessor of nuclear weapons. Their proliferation is banned by international treaties and no one is permitted to act in such a way that instead of a single nuclear power—the USSR—several appear within the framework of the country. On the international plane we do not have the legal right to do this.

[Dolinin] Will new problems arise with regard to the provision of weapons and military equipment for the missile forces under the conditions of the conversion of the defense sectors of industry and the market economy?

[Maksimov] Conversion has now encompassed virtually all defense industry enterprises ensuring deliveries of weapons and equipment to the missile forces. Under the conditions of the shortage of consumer goods in our country, the use of this powerful scientific and technical and production potential will undoubtedly make it possible to improve the quality and volume of general-purpose output. But I would highlight two aspects in this problem.

First, to preserve the necessary level for the defense industry in the process of conversion we need a unified state conversion program. Right now its elaboration is being complicated by the lack of a Union treaty and by existing differences in views between the sovereign republics and the center as to the aims and methods of conversion. In this situation it is essential primarily to preserve the existing scientific and technical and production potential of the defense industry and the cooperation in the development and production of missile weapons which has taken shape in the country over a long period. The defense enterprises which produce output solely for the missile forces are now situated on the territories of a number of republics and from the viewpoint of safeguarding the country's security the destruction of their production ties is impermissible.

And the second aspect. The transition to market relations, to contract and free prices under the conditions of the restriction of expenditure on defense create considerable difficulties in the fulfillment of the planned programs for the essential qualitative improvement of the Strategic Missile Forces. In addition urgent measures will be needed to prevent the drain of highly skilled specialists from defense enterprises.

It must be supposed that all these difficulties connected with the transitional period will be overcome with time.

[Dolinin] And a last question, Yuriy Pavlovich. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers, remembering the events of those three days in August, are raising particularly keenly the question of the control of nuclear forces. How safe is our country and the whole world today from the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons?

[Maksimov] I repeat my reminder that our military doctrine, which is of a defensive nature, provides for the use of nuclear weapons only in retaliatory actions. During the days of August 1991 no one threatened us with nuclear weapons so that means that they could not be used on our side.

As for the danger of the use of nuclear weapons because of an error or deliberate actions by individual violators or groups of people, then the protection system existing in the Strategic Missile Forces provides multiple safeguards against the use of nuclear weapons and rules out the possibility of one person making a decision and using them without authorization. So that any blackmail or pressure under those conditions was ruled out. In addition through the additional organizational and technical measures which have been adopted the ensuring of nuclear safety was strengthened even more at that moment and the system for the protection of nuclear weapons functioned irreproachably.

I want to stress that the missile troops are too serious a branch of the Armed Forces to be drawn into any political adventures.

Decree Sets Up 'Strategic Deterrence Forces'

PM1811180991 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 19 Nov 91 p 2

[Nikolay Panyukov report: "New Branch of Country's Armed Forces Created"]

[Text] A new branch of the Armed Forces—the Strategic Deterrence Forces [strategicheskkiye sily sderzhivaniya]—has been created by decree of the USSR president. Army General Yu. Maksimov has been appointed commander in chief of the Strategic Deterrence Forces.

Our correspondent was informed at the USSR Defense Ministry that the new branch of the Armed Forces is being created on the base of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the missile attack warning systems, the outer space control, the antimissile defense, and the directorate of the chief of space systems.

Aviation and naval strategic nuclear forces will be operationally subordinate to the commander in chief of Strategic Deterrence Forces.

Plans for Strategic Deterrence Forces Viewed

Military Expert Comments

LD1911190991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1450 GMT 19 Nov 91

[Excerpts] You probably know that Tatyana Chemodanova is rightly considered to be an expert on the Army and Army-related topics on Mayak Radio. She is now on a telephone link to our studio. What is the news, Tanya?

[Chemodanova] [passage omitted] A meeting with journalists, which took place at the Ministry of Defense today, has just ended. Taking part in it were Lieutenant General Valeriy Leonidovich Manilov, chief of the Information Directorate, and Lieutenant General Leonid Grigoriyevich Ivashov, chief of the Administration of Affairs of the Ministry of Defense.

[Studio reporter] What was the topic?

[Chemodanova] They briefed journalists on the changes that have taken place in the Armed Forces recently. For instance, it was reported that a decree was issued by USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on setting up a new type of troops in the Armed Forces. These troops will be called the Strategic Deterrence Forces [strategicheskkiye sily sderzhivaniya].

What kind of troops are these? The new type is based on the Strategic Rocket Troops, the Strategic Naval Forces, the Air Force, and the Main Directorate of Space Systems [Glavnoye Upravleniye Kosmicheskikh Sredstv]. Army General Yuriy Pavlovich Maksimov, commander in chief of the rocket troops, has been appointed commander in chief of the new type of troops. The new troops unite several structures with a view to defensive security, should such a need arise.

It was reported that a new committee for personnel work [po raboty s lichnym sostavom] within the Ministry of Defense has been set up. It is composed of the Directorate for Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen [Upravleniye Sotsialnoy i Pravovoy Zashchity Voenno-sluzhashchikh], the Directorate of Culture and Leisure [Upravleniye Kultury i Dosuga], and the departments for military sociological and professional orientation of cadres, technical resources, and international humanitarian links [otdela voenno-sotsiologicheskoy i professionalnoy orientatsii cadrov, tekhnicheskikh sredstv i mezhdunarodnykh gumaniticheskikh svyazey]. The committee is headed by Colonel General (Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Stepanovskiy), former deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate.

That is a proposal by the commission for the reform of the military and political structures, which is headed by Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov. Many journalists are interested in whether that new committee will not be reminiscent of the former Main Political Directorate. The organizers assure that it will not, that it is a

completely new structure, and that new forces have gone into it, including political workers of the former Main Political Directorate. From the named directorates one can draw a full conclusion about the forthcoming new activities of the committee. Many are interested in the idea that some republics, such as Azerbaijan and Armenia, want to draw up inventories of military property on the territories of the republics.

[Studio reporter] Was that also discussed?

[Chemodanova] That question is being discussed. So far, there has not been any concrete talk about it, but in the near future we will inform you about the position of the Ministry of Defense on that question. I would now like to end my report on today's news conference at the Ministry of Defense.

[Studio reporter] Thank you very much. That was Tatyana Chemodanova. I personally am very happy about the report that the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has been renamed the Directorate of Culture and Leisure.

Defense Ministry Spokesman Comments

LD1911202391 Moscow Radio Rossu Network in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Nov 91

[Text] The Strategic Deterrence Forces (SDF) include all strategic nuclear forces which form components of various services of the USSR Armed Forces. Commenting on the decree on setting up these forces, Valeriy Manilov, chief of the information directorate of the USSR Defense Ministry, said that they are based on the Strategic Rocket Troops, to which are added nuclear forces from the Air Force and the Navy are added. All these components are brought together under a single directorate.

Army General Yuriy Maksimov has been appointed commander of the SDF. Until recently he held the post of commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops.

Hopes for substantial economies are linked to the setting up of the SDF; such savings are extremely important for the country's Armed Forces as a whole in the conditions of the reduction of the military budget.

According to Manilov, the exclusively defensive mission of the SDF is evident in its very composition. The SDF structure takes into account the changes which will follow as a result of the realization of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments.

START TALKS

Commercial Potential of SS-18 Assessed

PM141122291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 10 Nov 91

[From the "TV Inform" newscast: Report by S. Yurakov and V. Rekut]

[Text] [Announcer] The stormy events in politics and the changes in the stores and booths have somehow fenced

off from us one of the most important problems whose solution should have a marked effect on our prosperity. I have in mind conversion. There have been many reports on changes in the defense industry but unfortunately so far there have been no results except for secret plants brought to the point of paralysis by hasty decisions.

[Yurakov] Over \$10 billion could be earned as early as the current decade on the world space services market. That is the belief of the country's leading economists. And our space rocket enterprises would be prepared to realize these opportunities. Recently the scientific public marked the jubilee of the founder of Soviet military rocket building, Academician Yangel, who celebrated his 80th birthday. Yangel and his successors created in the "Yuzhnoye" science and production association an enormous scientific and technical potential making it possible to create the most powerful combat rockets. In the past the state made enormous expenditures and it is time to return them. Hundreds of these rockets are becoming available as a result of the fulfillment of the strategic offensive arms limitation treaty. After all they could be successfully used for commercial space launches, which would yield up to \$100 million each.

[S.N. Konyushkov, general designer and general director of the "Yuzhnoye" science and production association, identified by caption] For instance the SS-18 rockets are potentially fine space craft launchers and we would be prepared to embark on this within the framework of cooperation with the international community but unfortunately there are substantial restrictions from the COCOM committee.

[Yurakov] The coordination committee for the control of exports to the socialist countries, or COCOM, is impeding the import of satellites on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Western countries are stating their sympathy with our economic troubles but nonetheless are not allowing us to earn hard currency. So in what spheres are our partners in the new thinking prepared to cooperate with us? Only the humiliating selling off of resources

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Latvians Allege Contamination From Skrunda Radars

92UN02740 Riga NEATKARIGA CINA in Latvia
10 Sep 91

[Untitled report by Semjons Spungins, LETA]

[Text] Assurances that the Dnieper anti-missile warning radar station, which is located to the north of Skrunda, is "not harmful" must be thoroughly examined. Although an expert committee drew the conclusion that its electromagnetic field is less than the maximum allowable

level and does not negatively affect residents, there is still cause for anxiety. The observations of Latvian scientists indicate that the pine forests in the vicinity of the radar station have suffered within a 30 kilometer radius. They concluded that noticeable wood growth decreased, and noted indications of clear pine needles withering. The Republic's bioindicator map labels this zone a "sore point."

Studies by scientific groups of the Skrunda vicinity continue. The participants include biologists, geographers, mathematicians, forest keepers and other specialists from scientific organizations and universities.

"In the vicinity of the station the forest's condition requires attention, although it is still too early to say that the direct cause of this condition is the electromagnetic field," said biological science candidate Valdis Balodis. Further complex studies are essential. Still, in the view of a scientist, it would be better to get rid of such sources of risk as the Dnieper station and the more powerful Daryal station, which is being built nearby.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Shaposhnikov: CFE Treaty To Be Ratified Soon

LD1311154491 Berlin ADN in German 1438 GMT
13 Nov 91

[Text] Stendal (ADN)—Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and [USSR Defense Minister] Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov have evaluated their three-day consultations which ended today as an important step in the strengthening of direct contacts between the German and Soviet Armed Forces. Following a joint visit to the troops in the Soviet Mahlwinkel barracks (in Saxony-Anhalt), Defense Minister Stoltenberg, talking to the press, referred to the agreement on the increased mutual exchange of army personnel. In addition to cultural and sport exchanges, study at teaching establishments in both countries is also included.

In addition, Stoltenberg also obtained more precise information from his counterpart regarding military reform and armed forces planning in the Soviet Union. Shaposhnikov also stated that the CFE disarmament treaty will be ratified shortly by the USSR.

Shaposhnikov reiterated that the dates set for the Soviet troop withdrawal from Germany would be "strictly adhered to." Slight alterations per month or per quarter would be agreed with the Defense Ministry. The withdrawal is not being accelerated or slowed down, there are merely certain postponements. With regard to the bases that have been vacated, attempts are being made to do justice to environmental demands, stressed Shaposhnikov.

Asked about the disputed future use of what is at present the Soviet armed forces' exercise ground at Colbitz-Letzlingerheide, Stoltenberg pointed out that, generally speaking, nothing has as yet been decided about the uses

to which exercise grounds belonging to the former National People's Army should be put. There are preparatory plans and ideas among the branches of the armed forces. A certain number of exercise grounds in the East and West is nevertheless needed, as military exercises on open land are being curtailed more and more, Stoltenberg said. Experience in the West shows, however, that such exercise grounds can be made use of from the environmental point of view.

A German-Soviet brigade like the German-French brigade is not under discussion at present. Both defense ministers said, however, that the future is open.

During their visit to the Mahlwinkel garrison, where Soviet motorized infantry, artillery, and helicopter troops are stationed, Stoltenberg and Shaposhnikov spoke at a forum for soldiers and their dependents. Prior to this, pilots of the Soviet Air Force gave an air display for the guests.

Central Officials on Troop Withdrawals From Baltics

Defense Ministry: No Withdrawal 'Soon'

LD1311121191 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT
13 Nov 91

[By correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 13 TASS—"There will be no planned withdrawal from the Baltic states soon," a spokesman at the Soviet Defence Ministry Press Centre told TASS on Tuesday [12 November].

The question of a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the region can be decided upon "only as a result of talks between the governments of the USSR and the Baltic states", the spokesman said in a comment on a report in the press about an alleged "withdrawal of a paratroop battalion from Estonia".

The spokesman specified that an assault combat battalion stationed at Viru had been disbanded recently under an earlier made arrangement with the government of Estonia.

The battalion personnel have been assigned to other units to bring them up to the full complement, the spokesman added.

MVD: Guards To Leave by 1 Jan

OW1311180791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1630 GMT 13 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] All the USSR Interior [MVD] Troops guarding transport, secret industrial facilities or prisons on the territory of the Baltic states are to be withdrawn by January 1, 1992. This has been given in an exclusive

interview with INTERFAX correspondent by the Petersburg Interior Chief General Arkadiy Kramerev who is responsible for the units in question. The general commented that [it] could have been done even earlier, but the Baltic authorities were delaying it, interested in the services of the guards in the interim period, particularly in prisons.

General Kramerev explained the guards will be moved to Russia's northwest, mostly the Petersburg region. The general expects several divisions to bolster the city's law and order and combat organized crime.

Further on Troop Withdrawals From Lithuania

Landsbergis at UN

LD1511050591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
2230 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Text] The chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Vytautas Landsbergis, said at a news conference in New York that Lithuania was going to submit for the consideration of the UN General Assembly or one of its committees the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Lithuania.

The press conference was held after the Lithuanian leader met with the secretary general of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar. The two officials discussed the contribution of the Baltic states to the UN budget, the setting up of a Baltic states foundation within the framework of the United Nations, and the pullout of Soviet troops from Lithuania. As Vytautas Landsbergis pointed out, the latter subject, together with the issues of Lithuanian-Soviet relations, was in the focus of the talks.

While in New York, the Lithuanian parliamentary leader met ambassadors to the United Nations of 15 states. Yet another meeting with representatives of the Simon Weisenthal Center, who had specially come to New York from Los Angeles, centered on the rehabilitation process in Lithuania and on proposals that a Weisenthal Center to protect this process. [sentence as heard]

Today Vytautas Landsbergis was a guest of honor at the congress of the American Jewish Committee, at which he made a speech. Before leaving New York, he also had to meet the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Thomas Pickering.

Republic To Help Army Leave; Equipment Stays

LD2011002291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0047 GMT 19 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 19 Nov (TASS)—"We will help the Soviet Army to leave Lithuania as soon as possible and we will try to organize this departure without conflicts wherever possible," states Lithuanian National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius in an interview with a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. Speaking about the new principles of setting up the

Lithuanian defense system in today's issue of the newspaper, he notes that there are four main programs being developed by the ministry: the border defense, the territorial defense, including the formation of the National Guard, the setting up of a regular army, and the civil defense.

Answering a question on the possibility of an armed conflict with neighbors, the minister said that "there is a high probability of political terrorism being stimulated by 'good neighbours'." Apart from this, he thinks that there are complex processes under way in the Soviet military units that may become uncontrollable, particularly during the withdrawal of troops.

As for the Soviet military equipment on the territory of Lithuania, Butkevicius said that "this equipment belongs to us, since the republic has contributed greatly to the military budget of the Soviet Union."

Landsbergis Comments

LD2611141191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 26 Nov 91

[Text] According to Vytautas Landsbergis, it is probably the new putchist plans and not the shortage of housing in Russia that is impeding the start of the withdrawal from Lithuania of Soviet troops by the Soviet leadership.

In a regular television address on 24 November, much attention was paid by the leader of the Lithuanian parliament to the presence of Soviet troops in Lithuania. According to Landsbergis, even if the problem of housing is delaying the withdrawal of troops, the Soviets should show goodwill and first withdraw the assault equipment. Commanders could then let the soldiers go home.

Landsbergis said that Lithuanian authorities have not been informed about the observed movement of armored military equipment. He said that the combat readiness of the military units is being checked, that there is an impermissible dissemination of weapons, and that the appearance of new paratroopers has been noted. He said that old January heroes continue to hold command posts, as well as the August putchists such as General Ovcharov, former deputy commander of the Soviet troops deployed in the Baltic states.

In Landsbergis' opinion, the Soviet Armed Forces are deliberately supplying weapons, including those with great destructive capacity, to anyone hoping that a situation like that in Nagorno-Karabakh will occur in Lithuania. The parliamentary chairman said that it is necessary to adopt a law as soon as possible to declare the handing over or selling weapons by the Soviet troops to anyone except the government of Lithuania as a crime of a destructive nature.

Controversy Continues Over Pullout From Estonia

Soviet Officers Demand Guarantees

OW1511004191 Moscow BALTFAX in English 2030 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In connection with the planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states, officers serving in an air force college in Daugavpils held a meeting at which they put forward several demands.

They demand that they should not be sent back to the Soviet Union before final documents are signed at the negotiations between the USSR and the Baltic states and that proper living conditions provided for them in the places where they are to serve.

They also insist that the Soviet troops stationed in the Baltics be given a clearly formulated status, that the flats built at the expense of the USSR Defence Ministry be privatised and given to the officers who live in them at present and that their pay be brought into line with the growing prices.

The officers demand that the personal property they will take with them when they move back to the Soviet Union be exempt from any customs duties.

Soviet Army Ready To Leave if Ordered

OW1411130791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1115 GMT 14 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On November 13, Estonia's State Minister Mr. Raivo Vare met with Commander of the Baltic Military District Mr. Valeriy Mironov, the Estonian Government's press service reports. During the talks the two officials discussed the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Estonia.

The government's defence adviser, Mr. Matti Pedak, told the newspaper *Paevaleht* that the schedule of withdrawal had not been discussed this time.

"Valeriy Mironov confirmed, however, that the moment the order was given from above, the Soviet Army would leave Estonia," said Mr. Pedak.

The talks also dealt with the transfer to the Estonian Government of the building which housed the air-borne battalion, recently withdrawn from Viru. Mr. Vare expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the withdrawal of another air-borne battalion, located in the Estonian city of Viliandi, has not begun yet.

Valeriy Mironov and Raivo Vare also agreed that the Estonian authorities would be informed in advance about the Soviet Army's military exercises in Estonia.

"We agreed that from now onwards the Soviet Army's military exercises would be attended by Estonian observers," said Mr. Pedak.

USSR Accused of Violating Accords

OW151122291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2106 GMT 15 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Mr. Ants Laaneots, acting chief of General Staff of the Estonian Defense Forces, told BALTFAX that "the Soviet Union keeps breaking agreements on the withdrawal of its troops from Estonia's territory." He claims that although one air assault battalion has been removed from Nursi, near the town of Voru, the battalion base is still under guard by the air assault troops and has not been transferred to Estonian authority. "The withdrawal of an air assault battalion from the town of Viljandi has not yet begun even though Estonian Premier Edgar Savisaar had reached a verbal agreement with the Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov that the withdrawal must start on November 3, 1991," said Mr. Laaneots.

The acting chief claimed that another agreement between Mr. Savisaar and Mr. Shaposhnikov, concerning a civil defense regiment which had been stationed in the town of Kohtla-Yahrve, had also been broken. On November 14 the regiment was pulled out of the republic but "took with it all weapons and equipment even though it was a condition of the agreement that all this must be left in Estonia," said Mr. Laaneots.

"All of these are violations of Soviet-Estonian agreements, and the Soviet Union can be regarded as an untrustworthy partner," he added.

Further Accusations

OW1811190691 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1805 GMT 18 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Enn Tupp, head of the commission on state protection of the Estonian parliament, told BF [BALTFAX] that "the Soviet Union constantly violates the agreements on the withdrawal of its troops from the Estonian territory".

As BF reported earlier, last week a civil defense regiment was withdrawn from the town of Johvi in the north-east of Estonia. The regiment pulled out with all of its arms and equipment despite the earlier agreement between Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and Soviet Defense Minister Evgeni Shaposhnikov under which they must have been left in Estonia for its own forces.

Mr. Tupp said the fact that officers of an airborne battalion withdrawn from the village of Nursi near the southern town of Voru continue to live in Voru arouses concern.

"These officers can very quickly form a strong detachment posing serious threat to Estonia", he noted.

Mr. Tupp said there are no guarantees that "a convoy regiment of the USSR Interior Ministry may also leave Estonia with all of its weapons and equipment". In accordance with agreements between Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar and USSR Interior Minister Viktor Barannikov, the regiment will be pulled out by July, 1992.

"Moscow feels it has cornered us, since there are absolutely no guarantees that the agreements will be carried out", Mr. Tupp pointed out.

He also expressed the opinion that the West can help Estonia settle this issue. He said that Western countries should understand that Soviet troops' presence in Estonia may ignite a conflict. "That is why the West can exert pressure on the Soviet Union by giving economic aid or granting money for accomodating Soviet officers withdrawn from the Baltics", Mr. Tupp said.

Ministry Notes Soviet 'Reluctance'

LD2011004991 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1800 GMT 18 Nov 91

[Text] The press center of the Estonian Foreign Ministry has been disseminating news saying that Foreign Ministry representative (Clyde Kull) today sent a note to the secretariat of the conflict prevention center drawing attention to the reluctance on the part of the USSR to begin thorough talks for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and to comply with the orders concerning USSR Armed Forces, which had been agreed. The conflict prevention center was set up in November of last year on the basis of the Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Weapons in Europe, concluded in Paris, in order to analyze the situation and to produce solutions in possible seats of conflict. The Estonian Foreign Ministry's note says that this kind of inactivity on the part of the USSR hinders Estonian independence endeavors. This was reported by the BALTIC NEWS SERVICE.

Protest to CSCE

OW1811210991 Moscow BALTFAX in English
2011 GMT 18 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian Foreign Ministry has sent a note to the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts, the working body of the Conference on Security and Cooperation [CSCE] in Europe. The note says the USSR is unwilling to begin serious talks on withdrawal of its troops and to carry out the agreements concerning their presence in the republic. The note points out that the Soviet Union's idleness hampers the development of Estonia's independence.

CFE Talks Said To 'Move Forward'*LD1511030491 Moscow TASS in English 1740 GMT
14 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna November 14 TASS—Things move forward at the current round of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE]. This was pointed out at a full-delegation session of the forum of 22 NATO and East European countries here today.

This applies primarily to the central aspect of the talks—the deliberation of an agreement on personnel cuts in the forces of the negotiating countries.

The need for practical work to draw up and edit a text of the document in question is moving into the order of the day. A number of delegations have already presented their visions of individual elements of the agreement and speakers at the session voiced an idea about the need to decide on the agreement's structure soon.

The character of the future accord remains undecided upon. The point is whether the document will be politically or legally binding. A number of delegations, including the Soviet one, favour the adoption of a politically binding agreement. The Soviet delegation, however, adheres to a flexible approach and is prepared to consider other options as well.

Judging by everything, headway is also beginning as regards another aspect of the talks—the coordination of stabilising measures. Western partners have stated their intention to make practical proposals on that score and presented preliminary considerations about categories of stabilising measures. It will be possible to judge the merits of such measures only when their substance becomes known.

Further on Disagreements With Poland on Withdrawal Terms**'High Charge' for Transit Noted***PM1811101991 Moscow KRISVAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Nov 91 First Edition p 3*

[Response by USSR Defense Ministry Central Directorate of Military Communications to reader's letter under the "From Competent Sources" rubric: "By Military Train Across Poland"—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] "The Soviet Union has pledged to withdraw its troops from German territory before the end of 1994—a very short period. Poland is taking advantage of this to set a high charge for the transit of Soviet military trains across its territory. How much is it asking for the transit of one train? A. Kuchmyi, Kharkov."

A standard international form of settlement in Swiss francs exists in the world today for transit operations.

The Soviet Union is paying 0.71 Swiss francs per axle-kilometer for transit operations across Polish territory. Military trains proceed from Frankfurt an der Oder to Brest via Poznan and Warsaw. The total length of the journey within Poland's borders is 681 km.

If you convert the payment into Deutschmarks [DM], the transit cost for a single 35-car train will total DM66,800.

Despite the fact that this appears quite an impressive sum, it is still below the international transit tariff. Talks are now being conducted with the Polish side on lowering it. Poland is prepared to lower the tariff but only after the USSR has cleared its debt in respect of transit operations across Poland's territory.

This response was obtained from the USSR Defense Ministry Central Directorate of Military Communications.

Polish Aide on Withdrawal Costs*PM1911113791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Nov 91 Union Edition p 6*

[Letter to editors from A. Magdziak-Miscievsk, press counselor at the Polish Embassy, published under the rubric "From the International Department's Mailbag": "The Polish Side Does Not Agree With the Commander"]

[Text] On 24 October 1991 IZVESTIYA (No. 254) published an interview with Colonel General V. Dubynin, commander of the Northern Group of Forces. Speaking of the problems involved in the withdrawal of troops from Poland, Gen. Dubynin stated that the Polish side is demanding \$46,000 for permission to use one railroad car. This is untrue. The Polish side, understanding the financial difficulties of its Eastern neighbors, fixed (as of 23 February 1991) a lower price for transportation—0.71 Swiss Francs [SFr] per axle-kilometer (the European tariff is SFr1.1).

Transport costs according to this tariff are several times less than the sum mentioned by the general. The assessment of our position and the motives for our actions given by A. Dubynin in the next part of the interview are also far from the intentions of the Polish side.

The fact that the general's statement appeared in a paper like IZVESTIYA on the eve of the initialing in Moscow of the treaty between the Republic of Poland and the USSR on the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish territory is grounds for astonishment. We would not like to think that V. Dubynin is distorting facts and consciously misleading public opinion in his country. We hope that there was a misunderstanding here which the general himself will refute as quickly as possible.

Respectfully,

[Signed] A. Magdziak-Miscievsk, press counselor at the Polish Republic Embassy

Latvian Official Views Soviet Army Withdrawal

LD1611104891 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 0530 GMT 15 Nov 91

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] A brake has been put on the handing over of the buildings and objects occupied by the Soviet Army to the establishments of power of Latvia, with the leadership of the military district announcing that an agreement first has to be reached in interstate talks. Government counselor Eriks Tilgass said that these questions have dragged on. The Baltic Military District has stopped this process, and they motivate their action of not starting the interstate talks. [passage omitted]

The position of the parliament and government of Latvia on this question remains unchanged. In this connection the Baltics cannot wait until 1994.

Talavs Jundzis, the head of the Supreme Council's commission for defense and internal affairs, in turn, expects that the question of withdrawal of the Army, simultaneously with other interstate relations' aspects, could start to be examined quite soon at the talks in Moscow. But the demand by the Baltic Council to free Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius from the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces as early as by 1 December of this year will not be fulfilled. This is what Talavs Jundzis says:

[Begin Jundzis recording] (?! here is activity), but they of course are not as serious as we would want them to be, by a long way. By 1 December, as it can be felt, there is no hope that something will change here.

Mr. Dinevics was in Moscow for two weeks in the hope of getting these talks started. Mr. Dinevics could tell more exactly, I must say, that there is a hope that these would, probably, start in the nearest future. [passage omitted]

The year 1994, when they should begin to withdraw their troops, is completely unacceptable, and there is no point of talking about or considering this. These dates depend on, more properly, they compel us to hurry. It is this unstable situation. On the one hand, right here on the spot, because it was the Army which organized and participated and led, and, so to say, did all the rest during the days of August and the days of January in Latvia. This is one aspect. The other aspect is that those processes that take place in the East, in the end it will be like that, whereby this Army will belong to no one after a time, yes? Therefore, you see, these are the two reasons which are hurrying us. [passage omitted]

The sequence of withdrawing the troops: It is not of little importance to us whether first, let us say, assault units are withdrawn or to ... withdrawal, perhaps, with some kind of construction units. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Omsk Depot Holds Tanks From Atlantic-to-Urals Zone

PM1811141991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 91 p 1

[L. Krutakov report. "Russia Is Vast, But There Is Nowhere To Hide Tanks"]

[Text] On 3 January 1991 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA put forward the hypothesis that one of the reasons for E. Shevardnadze's resignation from the post of foreign minister was the secret transfer by the military of a powerful tank grouping to beyond the Urals just before the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty. There were innumerable reproaches from the powers that be. Today this story has reached its logical conclusion.

Some 1,500 tanks in a state of full combat readiness massed at the edge of a forest, ready to start rolling with a clanking of tracks at any moment... This was the picture that presented itself to our photographer only 6-7 km from Omsk. The guard was purely symbolic: There is a checkpoint with gates but no fence and an officer and three young soldiers going through the motions of security procedures. You could just go in, pick a tank, start the engine, and drive off...

True to the behests of Suvorov, Major General A. Kuznetsov, chief of a Defense Ministry directorate (Anatoliy Borisovich refused to give the full title of his job), immediately went onto the offensive:

"I don't see what's sensational about this. The tanks are just standing here and, big deal, some of the paint has come off—we'll spruce them up in the spring. If the equipment had been abandoned, that would be another matter. This is a reserve, who knows what might happen tomorrow? And where would we be without tanks? It's not worth quoting me."

The following picture gradually began to emerge from a multitude of telephone calls and incomprehensible answers.

By chance the chief of one section (whose surname I promised not to reveal) let it slip that the decision to withdraw armored forces from East Europe was made hastily and is causing a lot of inconvenience. And so the trail from the unknown tank concentration extended across the Urals to Europe and led to the CFE Treaty. Incidentally, A. Kuznetsov admitted that the combined tank unit stationed near Omsk is partially made up of equipment from garrisons that have been eliminated in Germany, Hungary, and Poland.

Later things got easier. Through the information service (without explaining the task I had been set and without any mention of tanks) I stumbled upon a certain V. Lyashchenko. And this is what he told me. Under the terms of the CFE Treaty, all equipment stationed on territory between the Atlantic and the Ural mountains is to be destroyed. Only 750 tanks and 3,000 armored vehicles have been earmarked for conversion. The destruction and conversion are to be strictly monitored by European observers and must take place within rigorously restricted time frames (which are unrealistic for our country). Equipment based beyond the Urals, however, does not come within the scope of the treaty. When I laid all my cards on the table, V. Lyashchenko refused to comment, alleging that the matter was out of his jurisdiction; nor did he consider it necessary to give his rank and the title of his job.

The Russian Committee for Defense Affairs was far franker. Having listened to what I had to say, Departmental Consultant Yu. Deryugin gave the following answer:

"It looks very much as if your photographer stumbled across one of the bases where the armor secretly moved across the Urals at night is stationed. The armor was saved from destruction in this way. Although judging by what you have told me, it will not be possible to protect it from theft and destruction. Information from various sources puts the number of pieces of armored equipment hidden in Siberian forests at somewhere around 50,000."

U.S. Ratification of CFE Treaty Noted

92P50052A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Nov 91
Union Edition p 5

[Washington report by IZVESTIYA's own correspondent: "The U.S. Senate Has Ratified the Conventional Armaments Treaty"]

[Text] The Senate of the U.S. Congress last Monday [18 November] approved the treaty on reduction of conventional armaments in Europe [CFE] by an overwhelming majority of votes (90 in favor, 4 against). This is significantly more than the votes of two-thirds of the members of the Senate, which is necessary for treaty ratification.

G. Mitchell, leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, noted that this treaty has become an "important stage in guaranteeing security on the European continent." After approval by the Senate, this international document was sent to the White House for signature of the instrument of ratification by the President of the United States.

CSBM Delegation Submits New Working Document

LD2711172691 Moscow TASS in English 1620 GMT
27 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna November 27 TASS—A new working document was submitted to participants in talks on confidence-building measures [CSBM] in Europe by the Soviet delegation at a plenary meeting here today.

The document contains provisions for curtailing military activities and ensuring timely notification about them.

The gist of the Soviet proposal is as follows. The Soviet Union proposes, first of all, an agreement to ban military activities that member-states conduct on their own or in conjunction with other countries on their territory involving more than 40,000 personnel, or 800 combat tanks, or 1500 armoured vehicles.

Secondly, the number of permissible military events should be limited to six a year, provided they involve fewer personnel and less equipment but not more than 13,000 men, or 250 combat tanks, or 300 combat armoured vehicles. Of this number, not more than two should be permitted if they involve more than 25,000 men, or 400 combat tanks, or 750 combat armoured vehicles.

Thirdly, each two years, each member-state should be allowed to hold on its territory—independently or jointly with other countries—only one military event involving more than 40,000 men but anyway not more than 75,000.

Other states should be notified about such an event at least two years in advance.

"We hope," acting Soviet delegation head Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, who has just taken over from Oleg Grinevskiy appointed Soviet ambassador to Sweden, "that these proposals will help make work at the negotiations more specific, circumstantial and constructive"

NUCLEAR FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Demilitarization of Kola Peninsula Demanded

LD201115891 Moscow Radio Rossi Network
in Russian 0800 GMT 20 Nov 91

[Text] The Movement for a Nuclear Free North is carrying out an action aimed at the demilitarization of the Kola Peninsula. On the line is Yuriy Arkhipov, our Murmansk correspondent:

[Arkhipov] Despite the fact that the Red Banner Northern Fleet has slightly opened the curtains of secrecy and allowed into its domain deputies and independent experts who carried out an ecological inspection of its subunits, and that the president of Russia signed instructions on ending nuclear arms tests at the Novaya Zemlya test range, the Murmansk oblast remains—and probably will remain for a long time—the most militarized kray of our country. It is no joke to say that there are 300 nuclear reactors on the peninsula and they are used mainly for military purposes.

Therefore, the Movement for a Nuclear Free North thinks that the peninsula is still a test range for the use of the civilian and military atom. Spent nuclear reactors from nuclear submarines and the waste fuel of warships present a particular danger. There is also a danger from vessels with nuclear power engineering units of the Murmansk Maritime Fleet, which are repaired in docks situated 2,000 meters from the city center.

Taking all of that into account, the Movement is taking an action which consists of the following:

The Movement published an appeal in a local newspaper. It is short and I will read it: I—the first name and surname are given—demand that the nuclear arsenal on our Kola Peninsula should be reduced, that there should be permanent monitoring [kontrol] by the Committee for the Preservation of Nature and by independent ecological associations of military installations which are polluting the nature of the North.

It is not difficult to predict the reaction of the Red Banner Northern Fleet to such an action. The military will behave as if nothing has happened, and Felix Nikolayevich, as the commander of the Fleet is called, most probably will not learn of such epistles, unless of course, he happens to hear this bulletin.

[Announcer] By way of an addition to this material we report that of the overall number of reactors, only four are in the Kola nuclear electric power station. Their capacity is 440 megawatts each.

CENTER-REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Possible Russian-Ukrainian 'Nuclear Exchange' Viewed

924P00394 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 2-9 Nov 91 p 9

[Article by Stepan Kiselev: "Press Ministry Is Angry: 'An Advocate of War and National Strife' Speaks Out"—for item mentioned in first sentence, see Soviet Union DAILY REPORT for 31 Oct 91 p 62]

[Text] Background. MOSCOW NEWS No. 42 published my article which read: "MN's [MOSKOVSKIY NOVOSTI] reliable source says that a possibility of a nuclear exchange between the independent Ukraine and Russia was discussed in the wings of the Russian government."

The publication caused acrimonious reaction from both Russian and Ukrainian politicians. "An absurdity," "canard," "vicious nonsense," "a provocation"—such words were used by the men who are by their status obliged to think rather than condemn.

"You would do well to read fewer newspapers. You would certainly feel better," the President of the USSR is reported to have said to the Ukraine's First Vice-Premier

Konstantin Masik, although the President's own experience must have taught him otherwise: he had to pay with his Crimean imprisonment for ignoring press analyses and forecasts.

For politicians, the most practical attitude to newspaper publications would be to think, not to get mad.

Warning. When it's hard to think straight, one tends to have a temper tantrum. The Russian Federation Ministry of the Press and Mass Media, interpreting my article and a later publication in the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA as propaganda of war and national strife, issued an official warning. It was the ministry's first repressive act against newspapers, a first step to restrict freedom of the press and restore censorship. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA which published the notorious "Appeal to the People" as an ideological prologue to the August coup, had been spared the ministry's wrath.

It is quite natural for officials to want to bridle the press, but it is up to the court of justice and investigators to ascertain the presence of corpus delicti in a newspaper article. Also, our publication was essentially a consequence, whose cause lay in actual politics. Whether the Press Ministry likes it or not, the political reality is as follows: the two Slav Republics are falling apart thanks to politicians, not newspaper reporters. Former allies, the Ukraine and Russia have become mere neighbours and adjusted their policies accordingly.

Problem. It is common knowledge in foreign policy that neighbouring states are rivals and potential enemies. Most of my compatriots feel it intuitively to be true, because according to the public opinion poll published in the same issue (No. 42), 60 per cent of respondents saw major armed conflicts between former Soviet Republics as possible. Such pessimism must stem from the fact that, following the collapse of the Union, Republics have automatically become competitors on the world market, their competition burdened with a history of mutual grievances and hurts. In such a context, soldiers can no longer be expected to confine themselves to agricultural work alone.

Strategy. No one has ever said that former Union Republics really intend to use their armed forces for warfare. There is a world of difference between a readiness for action, and an actual intent. In a recent TV interview Gennady Burbulis, the Russian Federation Secretary of State, showed the difference graphically. "Russian has no intention of introducing customs stations to her borders," he said. "But she is prepared to do so at any moment." It is a statesman's duty to be prepared for any turn of events, and to have a plan of action for any contingency. As long as a state has an army armed with nuclear weapons, one has to be a simpleton to believe that their government has no plan of action for their use.

Therefore, the Russian Federation Press Ministry has done the Russian government a disservice by issuing a warning to the press. Unless the government of a nuclear

power has a well-thought-out nuclear strategy for all possible contingencies, it can be considered negligent.

Solution. The only alternative to an armed conflict between former allies is an economic union. The pact signed recently by the leaders of the Republics has to do with more than the economy. It has to do with security. My article that angered the Press Ministry so, was prompted by my concern for security, not war propaganda.

Central Control of Nuclear Weapons Discussed

LD1711212591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 17 Nov

[Interview with Lieutenant General Dimidiyuk, commander in chief of the Ground Forces Rocket and Artillery Troops, by unidentified correspondent, place and date not given; from the "TV Inform" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Dimidiyuk] We are proud of our type of troops, and we still traditionally meet the holiday on a high note, although you must understand that there are many questions which are yet to be resolved today.

[Correspondent] Missile weapons are situated in Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. Some sort of Army property privatization, so to speak, is currently under way in Georgia. What is your attitude toward this situation?

[Dimidiyuk] Wherever our missiles are, our firm position is that they should remain under centralized control. I do not think that anybody should lay claim to missile weapons. This is, in my view, impermissible.

[Correspondent] Do you also agree that this should have some kind of sole control?

[Dimidiyuk] On the whole, yes. On the whole, yes.

[Correspondent] There is a proverb saying that anything can happen, and even a log of wood can go off as a gun once in a blue moon. Is it possible that such a log of wood could go off somewhere in the republics that currently possess nuclear weapons?

[Dimidiyuk] You know, this is absolutely impossible. Nuclear weapons are in safe hands. They are guarded, and no unauthorized action can take place regarding nuclear weapons, as the technical and organizational conditions for their protection are arranged in such a way that nobody can resolve these issues without the center and experts.

NATO Statement on USSR Events Discussed

PM1911153991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Nov 91 Union Edition p 3

[Vikentiy Matveyev "Political Observer's Opinion:" "What Is at Stake"]

[Text] The Rome NATO session at the level of heads of state and government was marked by a 180-degree turn

by NATO regarding its attitude to our nuclear weapons. It is now no longer the very fact of their existence that is seen as a threat to the West. Concern—and there is no ambiguity here—is being expressed over the fact that they may become a bone of contention between certain parts of the former unitary Soviet power, as a result of which centralized control of them will be lost.

The NATO countries' governments would consider such a turn of events extremely undesirable. The "Statement on Events in the USSR" made on behalf of these countries contains an appeal to all organs of power in our country to "refrain from any steps capable of leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction." It is stressed that "this question affects the security interests of the whole Atlantic alliance, and also the security interests of the international community as a whole."

The NATO leaders did not go further than expressing this concern, but what was said was enough to bring home the seriousness of this political action.

Even previously American officials had made statements that Washington does not recognize and will not have any economic dealings with sovereign republics which, by their actions, undermine the commitments assumed by the USSR on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Evidently Western capitals are not inclined to calmly accept assurances from responsible representatives of military departments in Moscow regarding the reliability of the current control of Soviet nuclear weapons. Otherwise why would NATO issue a special statement on this subject? There is no clarity on a number of important questions. Where will the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which also includes tens of thousands of tactical charges, ultimately be stationed? At what rate will this arsenal be reduced? What will the "central command" be in conditions of the disintegration of the former Union?

At the same time our side scarcely has a clear idea of what Washington and Brussels intend to do if the aforementioned statement by the NATO countries' leaders does not produce the desired effect.

The new Atlantic strategic concept, which proceeds from the radical improvement in the situation in Europe as a result of the disappearance—as another document of the Rome NATO session says—"of the massive and potentially direct threat," nevertheless points out that "there exists a great risk of the emergence of other crises which could develop rapidly and would demand a rapid reaction."

To this end it is planned to create a small but mobile contingent of "immediate and rapid reaction forces" while at the same time preserving the integrated military structure based on common operational planning, multinational formations, stationing forces outside national

territories wherever appropriate, on a mutual basis, common standards for military hardware, and so on.

The NATO countries' governments would also like to see an analogous approach to the future of the Armed Forces within the framework of the community of sovereign republics of our former unitary state. They do not perceive the rather close integration of their national Armed Forces as detrimental to themselves from the viewpoint of their rights and prerogatives. While remaining masters in their own home, in this way they can best ensure peaceful coexistence and also defend their vital interests from possible dangers and threats from outside.

And if these governments are now expressing concern at the threat posed by the chaotic state of affairs regarding nuclear weapons and the Armed Forces in general on the enormous territory of what used to be the Soviet Union, how much more serious must the risk be to all of us living on this territory if things really do descend into chaos!

The lessons of the bloody internecine conflict in Yugoslavia are before everyone's eyes. But the former USSR is dozens of "Yugoslavia's" in size and, what is more, it has the most murderous and destructive weapons.

Now even the central Yugoslav leadership has appealed to the UN Security Council to send special UN forces to the conflict areas in order to assist in ending hostilities. It is reported that around 10,000 well armed servicemen with air and sea support may be needed for this.

The United Nations already has many peacemaking operations to its credit and their scope is being extended. Whereas in the first 40 years of the organization's existence, that is, by the mid-1980's, 13 such operations had been carried out, eight have been carried out in the last three years alone. In Europe, however, there have never been any before. Yugoslavia may become the first such arena on the continent. The difficulties, both political and technical, will be colossal, and chances of success are by no means guaranteed unless the people involved in the conflict come to their senses.

Any dispute, and particularly a conflict, is always immeasurably more difficult to end than to prevent. This is a truism, but it is not always grasped in time.

The "Statement on Events in the USSR" by the NATO countries' leaders does not contain any threats. It rightly warns against hasty steps and actions in a sphere affecting the lives of many people. And everyone who realizes what is at stake here should undoubtedly listen attentively.

RSFSR Foreign Ministry on Role in Arms Control Talks

*OW1911154791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1449 GMT 19 Nov 91*

[Report by Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev from "Diplomatic Panorama" transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Foreign Ministry expert said that Russia did not view its more radical line than the Union's on the reduction of tactical and strategic armaments as contradictory. According to him, the initiatives of the Russian leadership must be viewed as "a contribution to Soviet-US dialogue on these issues."

The statement was made to DP [Diplomatic Panorama] during the runup to the second round of Soviet-US negotiations on the realization of interlocking Soviet and US initiatives on nuclear disarmament that begins in Washington on November 25. The Russian Foreign Ministry will participate in the talks, said the ministry. Its delegation will be led by the USSR deputy foreign minister Alexei Obukhov.

The expert said the following to explain the position of the RSFSR: "We are not speaking on behalf of the Union, and nuclear weapons and united armed forces will remain under common control. So in this case the Union poses as the US partner in this dialogue." The republican official also said that Russia's special considerations will to some extent find a reflection in the Union position that had been developed especially for the talks.

Asked by DP, the expert said that Russia would act in Washington on the assumption that the Union must be preserved as a common strategic space. As is clear from Russian President Yeltsin's statements, Russia is ready to move all Soviet weapons to its territory, but this position, said the RSFSR Foreign Ministry expert, "is not shared by other sovereign states."

In addition to Russia, the Soviet delegation will include Ukrainian, Kazakh and Belarus [Belorussia] representatives.

Yeltsin Aides Reject Report on Launch Codes

*LD2011003291 Moscow POSTFACTUM in English
2244 GMT 19 Nov 91*

[Text] RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential staff officials reject a report in INDEPENDENT that Yeltsin is followed everywhere by an officer with codes used in launching nuclear missiles. The daily INDEPENDENT published the report on November 18. The RSFSR president, said RSFSR presidential staff officials, is exercising control over nuclear weapons on the same grounds as the presidents of other sovereign republics are.

1,000 Nuclear Warheads Remain in Kazakhstan

LD2811133191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1300 GMT 28 Nov 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev has stated there are more than 1,000 nuclear warheads on the territory of Kazakhstan. In his words, the warheads should remain where they are. At the same time, Nazarbayev has noted that Kazakhstan is not claiming a nuclear monopoly and supports the idea of the united Armed Forces and united centralized control over nuclear weapons.

Ukrainian Official Stresses Non-Nuclear Status

LD2811152391 Moscow TASS in English 1306 GMT 28 Nov 91

[By correspondent Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy]

[Text] Prague November 28 TASS—"The Ukraine is on its way to building a democratic independent state". Nikolay Makarevich, the first deputy minister of the

Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said today in an interview with MLADA FRONTA DNES, a Czechoslovak newspaper.

The Ukrainian representative, who is in Czechoslovakia on a working visit, stressed the republic will be a non-nuclear, neutral state, and voluntarily take on all obligations, arising from international agreements - first of all, from the treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

"We do not want to and will not be a nuclear state which would violate the geopolitical and geostrategic balance in the world", Makarevich emphasised.

"The Ukrainian Army will be 100,000-strong at most. It will be a small, mobile, professional army, ready to protect interests of the Ukrainian state and the people", he indicated.

"I wish to assure Czechoslovak citizens that no powerful military force will threaten them on the part of the Ukraine. Quite the reverse, an important document on cooperation and neighbourliness between the Ukraine and Czechoslovakia which will form the basis of their future mutual relations, is now under preparation". Makarevich pointed out.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EC Warns Ukraine To Honor Arms Control Agreements

AU0212121091 Paris AFP in English 1204 GMT
2 Dec 91

[Text] Brussels, Dec 2 (AFP)—The European Community (EC) warned Ukraine here Monday [2 December] to respect all arms control agreements signed by the Soviet Union, and to do nothing to endanger the security of nuclear weapons in its territory.

EC foreign ministers issued a statement welcoming the democratic way in which they said Ukraine conducted a referendum Sunday which according to initial reports resulted in a big vote in favour of its independence from the Soviet Union.

The ministers, who were meeting here, issued a statement calling on the Ukraine, the central Soviet authorities and other Soviet republics to ensure a "peaceful, democratic and orderly" evolution of events.

They urged Ukraine to maintain "an open and constructive dialogue" with the rest of the Soviet Union so that all Soviet commitments with the outside world would be upheld.

The ministers referred particularly to guarantees for the safety of minority groups contained in the Final Helsinki Act and the Charter of Paris, signed by the Soviet Union and all other European countries.

The ministers said the EC expected Ukraine and other Soviet republics to accept responsibility for the massive Soviet foreign debts. They did not recognise Ukrainian independence.

GERMANY

Draft of CFE-2 Treaty Presented at Vienna Talks

LD2111231691 Hamburg DPA in German 1344 GMT
21 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Vienna (DPA)—Eleven of the 22 states participating in the Vienna disarmament follow-up negotiations (Conventional Forces in Europe, CFE), including Germany, France, Great Britain, Hungary, and the United States, put forward their first draft of the treaty on troop reductions. According to the acting CFE chairman, the German delegation leader Ruediger Hartmann, the draft is to serve as a working document and give the necessary impetus for the conclusion, planned for the spring. "I expect that the process can now move forward quickly," Hartmann said on 21 November to journalists.

The draft text distinguishes between the personnel in the land and air forces, which are to be registered and limited by the treaty, and paramilitary units, about which there is simply to be an exchange of information

between the relevant states. This also applies to army units in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. No figures are yet mentioned in the draft. Hartmann did, however, add the proviso that because of the tendencies towards dissolution in the USSR, delays would have to be expected.

Above all, the possible inclusion of the Ukraine, if it should secede from the Union before the end of this year, would confront the negotiations with a new situation. Hence, they are trying to take account of the interests of the Ukraine even at this stage, said Hartmann. If the split should come about, then a delegation from the republic itself could attend the CFE negotiations. [passage omitted]

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Proceeding on Schedule

LD2511160691 Berlin ADN in German 1538 GMT
25 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Leipzig (ADN)—About 150,000 soldiers, civilian employees, and relatives of the Western Group of Soviet armed forces will have left the new federal laender by the end of this year. Thus the partial withdrawal planned for 1991 can be fulfilled "on the dot," according to Major General Hartmut Foertsch, the Federal Government's representative in charge of withdrawal. Up to now the plan has been 90-percent fulfilled for military hardware and 89 percent for personnel, he told press representatives in Leipzig on Monday. [passage omitted]

Details of Soviet Troop Withdrawals Reported

AU3011203291 Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German
27 Nov 91 p 4

[Tomas Morgenstern report: "Withdrawal Is a Historic Opportunity"]

[Text] Berlin—On Monday evening [25 November] a discussion round of the German Committee for European Security and Cooperation in Berlin drew up a positive interim balance sheet on the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from German territory. Speaking to military experts, politicians, and diplomats, Colonel Strelnikov, head of the Soviet side of the German-Soviet commission for troop withdrawal, reported that by 24 November about 95 percent of the troops, technical equipment, and other equipment scheduled to leave Germany in 1991 had left. That involves 154,150 men (of 546,000 stationed at the beginning of the year), 1,498 tanks (of more than 4,000), 2,300 vehicles (of 8,000), 1,200 artillery systems (of 3,500), 118 helicopters (of more than 600), 130 planes (of more than 600), and 260,000 tonnes of ammunition (of 700,000 tonnes).

The withdrawal plan envisages the reduction of the troops of the Western Group by an annual 30 percent from 1991 to 1993 and the conclusion of the withdrawal

in 1994. Colonel Freiherr von Grothe, chief of staff in the German liaison command, confirmed that the schedule is being observed.

The Soviet military officer pointed out that the withdrawal of the Western Group, which had been established over 40 years, naturally entails problems. Thus, the completely unexpected internal problems in the USSR make it necessary to transfer all returning troops to Russian territory. Of particular concern are those 55,000 members of the Western Group, who, according to Strelnikov, do not have any place to live at home. By the end of 1991 another 2,000 apartments will be completed with German help—Bonn has provided a total of DM7.8 billion. Further resources are being used to prepare the soldiers for civilian occupations, which is also taking place in Germany.

According to Strelnikov, 20,000 soldiers are working every day on correcting environmental damage on territory occupied by the Western Group. As fundamental improvement would take another 15 to 20 years of comparable effort, the Soviets are obviously intending to complete only basic progress on the old burdens by the time the premises are handed over. Independent of such insufficient improvement, it is, however, intended to make the Federal Government pay 10.7 billion marks for buildings and infrastructure. That prospect was energetically opposed by Bundeswehr Colonel Von Grothe, who called for determining the value of the real estate and balancing it against the expected improvement costs. It is to be hoped that the zero-option proposal by Helmut Domke, Brandenburg's commissioner for conversion, will meet with increased interest. Renouncing the respective demands, however, requires political decisions. All parties involved recognized the historic opportunity offered for mutual relations by the tenure of the Western Group, which is limited in terms of time. Improved relations in various locations are a good beginning. It is generous and also shameful for the Germans that the Soviets do not wish to exaggerate the importance of 207 criminal attacks on their soldiers so far this year.

Bundesrat Ratifies Conventional Disarmament Treaty

LD2911121391 Hamburg DPA in German 1138 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Today the Federal Republic ratified the disarmament treaty between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact states. The German documents can now be deposited after this action of assent by the Bundesrat as the last legislative authority. The core of the treaty is a reduction in conventional armaments during the next few years and the commitment made by the parties to the treaty on limiting the numbers of personnel.

GREECE

Spokesman: No Border Troops Talks With Bulgaria, Turkey

NC2011172991 Athens Elliniki Radhiofonia Radio Network in Greek 1230 GMT 20 Nov 91

[Text] A Foreign Ministry press spokesman says no negotiations have been agreed upon or are developing between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The statement was made in response to a statement by Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev that advanced negotiations are developing between the three countries for the withdrawal of troops from an 80-km zone on either side of the respective borders.

NORWAY

Defense Minister on Nordic Security Situation

PM1911154091 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 Nov 91 p 11

[Report on interview with Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst by Mikael Holmstrom; place and date not given]

[Text] As a result of today's rapid transformation of European security policy, Sweden and Finland run the risk of becoming isolated and Norway's influence is being weakened. In the longer term it is impossible to rule out armed conflicts in the north between Russia and Norway. Such is the analysis of Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst (Labor Party).

"Even though this may happen in different ways and in different contexts, the Nordic countries will undergo some marginalization in relation to European developments," Johan Jorgen Holst told SVENSKA DAGBLADET and asked worriedly:

"How can our Nordic interests best be satisfied in a period when the whole of the political order in Europe is being reshaped?"

According to the Norwegian defense minister Norway is already finding it difficult to defend its security policy interests:

"I have noted that our negotiating strength within NATO has been weakened as a result of developments. In the future the most important questions, both for Americans and for Europeans, will be discussed in forums in which Norway does not participate."

He was referring to the fact that Norway is not a member of the EC, nor is it a member of the WEU [Western European Union]. It looks like the WEU will become the "European pillar" in the new European defenses with links both with the EC and NATO.

"NATO will be maintained as the framework for security policy. But within this framework these organizations

will determine the overall picture. From the security viewpoint Norway ought therefore to be part of both the WEU and the EC," Holst said.

Neutral Sweden and Finland are peripheral countries to an even greater extent, even though they are moving toward the EC. Neutral countries will fall outside the newly formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).

NATO has invited the three Baltic states and the six former Warsaw Pact countries to an initial NACC meeting in Brussels on 20 December. The 25 countries will regularly and when necessary exchange political and military information at several levels.

"It is an eye-opener that this cooperation arrangement is being set up between former antagonists. The former neutral and nonaligned countries will find themselves in a different group, outside. As things are going at present, they will become isolated, and they will not have the same direct access to information," Johan Jorgen Holst said.

Should the Nordic area put its energies into Nordic cooperation, or enter the EC and the WEU?

"The different Nordic countries will have to make up their own minds on this, taking as their point of departure their own situation or their own interests."

Has time begun to run out for the concept of neutrality?

"You could perhaps say that there is no longer a situation in which nonalignment and neutrality are the main elements of a country's foreign policy. These concepts must be defined on the basis of the interests which are to be defended. They will become more of a formal description of a position," Johan Jorgen Holst replied.

In conversations with SVENSKA DAGBLADET Swedish government experts have claimed that the NACC will not be that important, but this view is not shared by Norway's defense minister:

"Some of the cooperation which people thought would be anchored in the CSCE will be shifted over to the NACC," Holst said, mentioning security policy, the implementation of the CFE agreement, and crisis management.

What worries Holst is the fact that in parallel with the political marginalization of the Nordic area there is also a shift in military strategy.

At its Rome summit a little over a week ago NATO wrote off the threat of a large-scale invasion from the Soviet Union. As a result Central Europe's interest in the Nordic area is decreasing. In the old superpower balance it was through control of Norway and the surrounding sea areas that NATO was able to make sure that the United States really was able to bring reinforcements to Europe across the Atlantic.

"We have probably become less important to the defense of Central Europe," Johan Jorgen Holst said.

Norway is the only West European NATO country with a land border with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's Northern Fleet is constantly undergoing modernization, despite all the leadership changes in Moscow. Air force units and modern materiel that is being withdrawn from Central Europe is being deployed on the Kola Peninsula.

In a speech on 28 August Holst reminded his audience that traditionally Russia has always striven for influence and control over its immediate environs.

"In the longer term we cannot rule out the possibility that local ambitions could give rise to limited armed conflicts without being linked to broader objectives in Europe. This is why we have to take a very close look at our defense capacity in Finnmark (the area closest to the Soviet border)."

This statement goes against the conventional wisdom that has guided 40 years of defense planning, not least in Sweden. Isolated attacks on one country in the Nordic area have been ruled out, conflicts have simply been seen as part of a global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

"Now that the cold war and confrontation are gone, there is no longer this linkage with a major conflict."

"In the short term it is unlikely that there will be a conflict here, but a military capacity which could be used to this end does exist. We do not know which political impulses and trends will dominate Russia in the future," Johan Jorgen Holst said, commenting on the situation in Finnmark with the words:

"I do not think it very wise to disarm there at present."

"We cannot create a local balance of military power. The security challenge lies in organizing developments in such a way that Moscow and St. Petersburg view their proximity to Norway as part of Russia's relations with Western Europe."

UNITED KINGDOM

Labor Party Criticizes Nuclear Test in U.S.

LD2811203591 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1745 GMT 27 Nov 91

[By PRESS ASSOCIATION Defense correspondent
Charles Miller]

[Text] Labour tonight demanded a government statement about the need for Britain's latest underground nuclear test. The test, codename Bristol, took place in a shaft 1,500 ft below the Nevada Desert in the United

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27 Feb 1992